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STATEMENT SHOWING J U R I S D I C T I O N 
J u r i s d i c t i o n i s c o n f e r r e d upon t h i s h o n o r a b l e c o u r t 
CASE TITLE 1 
h e r e i n by Rule 54 (b ) Utah R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e a n d Rule 4 R. 
Utah S. C t . 
NATURE OP THE PROCEEDING 
T h i s a p p e a l i s from ci f i n a l s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t of t h e 
c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o Rule 54 (b ) Utah R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e i n 
f a v o r of P l a i n t i f f s ( A p p e l l e e s ) and a d v e r s e t o D e f e n d a n t s . 
I S S U E S PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w : 
1) I s t h e q u e s t i o n of t r u e i d e n t i t y a g e n u i n e m a t e r i a l 
f a c t p r e c l u d i n g s u m m a r y j u d q m e n t ? 
2) How d o e s t r u e i d e n t i t y b e a r upon p r i n c i p l e s of 
s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s j u r i s d i c t i o n , j u d g m e n t a q a i n s t a l l d e f e n d a n t s , 
a t t a c h m e n t of r e a l p r o p e r t y j u d i c i a l l i e n s , e x e c u t i o n and s a l e , 
b o n a f i d e p u r c h a s e r , and r e s j u d i c a t a ? 
3) What i s f a i r and c o m p l e t e a d j u d i c a t i o n of an i s s u e 
r e q u i r i n g i s s u e p r e c l u s i o n u n d e r t h e p r i n c i p l e of r e s j u d i c a t a ? 
4) What e f f e c t d o e s new e v i d e n c e h a v e o e r t a i n i n q t o t h e 
p r i n c i p l e of r e s j u d i c a t a ? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
ARE DETERMINATIVE 
The following statutes and rules whose interpretation are 
required in determining the issues presented are: 
UCA 1953 Section 78-22-1(1) 
UCA 1953 Section 25-1-15(2) before amendment 
UCA 1953 Section 25-1-13 before amendment 
UCA 1953 Section 25-6-9(1) 
UCA 1953 S e c t i o n 5 7 - 3 - 2 , a s amended 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 2 
UCA 1953 S e c t i o n 5 7 - 3 - 3 , a s amended 
Rule 1 0 , URCP 
Rule 17d, URCP 
Rule 54b , URCP 
Rule 56 , URCP 
Rule 58A, URCP 
S a i d s t a t u t e s and r u l e s a r e s e t f o r t h v e r b a t i m in t h e 
a p p e n d i x h e r e t o . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CASE NATURE, COURSE AND LOWER COURT DISPOSITION 
T h i s i s a c a s e of TRUE IDENTITY. I t i n v o l v e s t h e u s e of 
l a b e l s ( i d e n t i t y c a m o f l a u g e , f i c t i t i o u s n a m e s , p s e u d o n y m n s , 
a s s u m e d n a m e s ) i n b u s i n e s s and r e a l e s t a t e t i t l e t r a n s a c t i o n s 
a n d how t r u e i d e n t i t y of t h e i n d i v i d u a l s u s i n g t h o s e b u s i n e s s 
l a b e l s a f f e c t s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of o t h e r l e g a l D r i n c i o l e s which 
i m p a c t t h e r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of o t h e r c i t i z e n s who i n 
one way o r a n o t h e r c a m e i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h one o r more of t h e 
l a b e l e d b u s i n e s s e s . 
The V r e e k e n F a m i l y c o m p o s e d of f a t h e r F r e d , m o t h e r 
M a r i l y n , and s o n s K u r t , K e i t h and C h r i s [ K r i s ] [ h e r e i n a f t e r 
c a l l e d "JUDGMENT DEBTORS"] s e t UP an a r t i c u l a t e and e l a b o r a t e 
w h i t e c o l l a r i n v e s t m e n t s c h e m e p e n e t r a t i n g a l l of t h e 50 U n i t e d 
S t a t e s and s o m e f o r e i g n n a t i o n s i n t h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 ' s and e a r l y 
1 9 8 0 ' s . They f i r s t o p e r a t e d i n C a l i f o r n i a and t h e n moved t h e i r 
b a s e of o p e r a t i o n t o t h e o b s c u r e s m a l l r u r a l t own of L e h i , Utah 
i n t h e l a s t p a r t of t h e 1 9 7 0 ' s . They a d o p t e d and u s e d o v e r 20 
f i c t i t i o u s b u s i n e s s n a m e s w h i c h t h e y u s e d t o c o n d u c t v a r i o u s 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS DETERMINATIVE 3 
fac tor ing , commodity fu tures , op t ions , supposed tax she l te r 
l imi ted par tnersh ips and other investment schemes. New f i c t i -
t i ous bus iness names used by them are s t i l l beinq uncovered 
today. (See p a r t i a l l i s t r ec i t ed on page 13.) They also 
purchased numerous parcels of r ea l e s t a t e in Utah and elsewhere 
using some of t h e i r f i c t i t i o u s bus iness names but never 
purchased any r ea l property in t h e i r personal ind iv idual names. 
The family sent out l e t t e r s to t h e i r numerous inves to r s 
in early 1983 ind ica t inq the board of d i r ec to r s of each 
pa r t i cu la r inves tment en t i t y had determined to l iqu ida te and 
enclosed a token check of a very small par t of each i nves to r ' s 
inves ted funds. Some of these inves to r s were lucky enouqh to 
quickly f i le su i t and obtain judgments in Utah County, Utah in 
the names of some of these f i c t i t i o u s bus iness ' names. 
Rone, Bieber (who runs h is own ranch in South Dakota 
called "RAB Ranch"), and Gregg [here inaf ter called "JUDGMENT 
CREDITORS"] were three of those i n v e s t o r s . Since t h e i r 
judgments in 1983, they have been t ry ing to sa t i s fy t h e i r 
r e spec t ive judgments. 
US Federal Tax Evasion cases were filed aqa ins t Fred and 
Kurt Vreeken which event ia l ly resul ted in guil ty ve rd ic t s on 
cer ta in counts . USA v Fred & Kurt Vreeken, CR 84-48, Utah 
D i s t r i c t . Fred and Kurt Vreeken served one year in federal 
pr i sons and halfway houses as condi t ions of probation and 
brought back over $900,000.00 from overseas in to the US and 
deposi ted said funds with the US Utah D i s t r i c t Court to be used 
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p a r t i a l r e s t i t u t i o n of inves tors and other c r ed i to r s . The fund 
i s s t i l l being held by a US Federal Court rece iver pending 
d i s t r ibu t ion determinat ion by the federal court . But the US 
In terna l Revenue Service has levied upon said fund claiming 
f i r s t p r io r i ty to al l of them. 
In an effort to recover part or all of the remaining 
balances of t h e i r judgments, the Judgment Creditors executed 
upon two parcels of property in Lehi, Utah County, Utah and 
th ree parcels of property in Alpine, Utah County, Utah in which 
the Vreeken Family had had fee t i t l e ownership through t he i r 
f i c t i t i o u s bus iness names a t the t ime the Judgment Creditors 
obtained t h e i r separa te judgments. 
Property owners of two of the three parcels located in 
Alpine, Utah objected to the execut ions and filed t h i s act ion as 
p la in t i f f s [here inaf ter called "OWNERS"] in the Fourth Judic ia l 
Court, Utah County, honorable Boyd L. Park pres id ing , to enjoin 
the levy and sale of t h e i r r e spec t ive parcels of property. The 
Sheriff of Utah County who levied upon the two parcels of Alpine 
property was named as the f i r s t defendant [hereinaf ter called 
"SHERIFF"] and the Judgment Creditors were named as further 
defendants . 
After submission of a f f idavi t s and other evidence, the 
t r i a l court granted the Owners summary judgment aga ins t the 
Sheriff and Judgment Creditors regarding the Owners1 r igh t to a 
permanent injunction precluding further execution by the 
Sheriff and Judgment Creditors on the Owners1 two parcels of 
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p r o p e r t y i n A l p i n e , U t a h . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE I S S U E S PRESENTED 
I n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 7 , D e f e n d a n t s R o n e , B i e b e r d b a RAB 
R a n c h , a n d G r e q g , a s J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s , e x e c u t e d u p o n 3 
p a r c e l s o f r e a l p r o p e r t y i n A l p i n e , U t a h C o u n t y , U t a h t o s a t i s f y 
3 s e p a r a t e o u t s t a n d i n g j u d g m e n t s c l a i m e d t o a t t a c h a s j u d q m e n t 
l i e n s u p o n s a i d A l p i n e p a r c e l s . [ R 1 8 1 1 - 1 8 1 5 ] D e f e n d a n t B a t e -
m a n , a s U t a h C o u n t y S h e r i f f , l e v i e d u p o n t h e A l p i n e p a r c e l s i n 
h i s c a p a c i t y a s s h e r i f f . [ R 1 8 0 4 - 1 8 1 0 ] T h e 3 j u d g m e n t s h a d 
b e e n e n t e r e d i n U t a h C o u n t y i n 1 9 8 3 a g a i n s t n u m e r o u s f i c t i t i o u s 
b u s i n e s s n a m e s a n d C h r i s [ K r i s ] a n d K e i t h V r e e k e n a s 
i n d i v i d u a l s i n 2 of t h e 3 s e p a r a t e c a s e s ( J u d g m e n t D e b t o r s ) , 
n a m e l y : 
MONEY FACTORS SYNDICATE, AG; FIRST FEDERAL 
FINANCE, AG; AIRES + SERV, SA; INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT CONFERENCE; a n d OPTION WRITERS SYN-
DICATE on J u l y 2 6 , 198 3 i n f a v o r of J u d g m e n t 
C r e d i t o r B . J . Rone [ R 1 0 9 4 ] 
CHRIS [KRIS] VREEKEN; KEITH VREEKEN; MONEY 
FACTORS SYNDICATE; FIRST FEDERAL FINANCE, AG; 
AIRES + SERV, SA; INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
CONFERENCE; AND OPTION WRITERS SYNDICATE on 
A u g u s t 2 5 , 1 9 8 3 , 1 1 : 1 9 A . M . , i n f a v o r of 
J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r J a m e s A. G r e g g [ R 1 7 2 3 ] ; a n d 
CHRIS VREEKEN; KEITH VREEKEN; MONEY FACTORS 
SYNDICATE; FIRST FEDERAL FINANCE, AG; AIRES + 
SERV, SA; INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CONFERENCE; 
•and OPTION WRITERS SYNDICATE on A u g u s t 2 5 , 
1 9 8 3 , 1 1 : 2 0 A . M . , i n f a v o r of J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r 
R o n a l d A. B i e b e r a n d RAB R a n c h [ R 1 6 6 7 ] 
O w n e r s h a d a c q u i r e d r e c o r d t i t l e t o 1 o f t h e A l p i n e 
p a r c e l s i n 1 9 8 4 f r o m a t i t l e h o l d e r l a b e l e d R e d D e e r 
I n v e s t m e n t s a n d Red D e e r I n v e s t m e n t s , SA. [ R 3 1 4 ] R e d D e e r 
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I n v e s t m e n t s and Red Deer I n v e s t m e n t s , SA were two of t h e 
b u s i n e s s n a m e s u s e d by J u d g m e n t D e b t o r s . [ R 4 9 0 , 5 0 1 - 5 0 3 ] 
A n o t h e r c r e d i t o r of t h e J u d g m e n t D e b t o r s , D. & M. Coa l ComDany, 
a l s o c l a i m e d r i g h t s t o a 1984 r e c o r d e d T r u s t Deed on one of t h e 
A l p i n e p a r c e l s , a l l e g e d l y n o n j u d i c i a l l y f o r c l o s e d i t s TD and D. & 
M. ' s i n t e r e s t was p u r c h a s e d by s o m e of t h e Owners i n 1 9 8 6 . 
[ R 3 3 3 , 3 4 2 , 3 4 6 ] B e c a u s e of t h e i r a c q u i r e d r e c o r d t i t l e 
p e r t a i n i n g t o 2 of t h e A l p i n e p a r c e l s , Owners c o m m e n c e d t h i s 
s e p a r a t e s u i t t o e n j o i n t h e J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s from s e l l i n g t h e i r 
2 of t h e t h r e e p a r c e l s of A l p i n e p r o p e r t y . Owners a l l e g e d no 
l i e n s of t h e J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s a t t a c h e d t o t h e 2 A l p i n e p a r c e l s 
d u e t o 1) i n v a l i d j u d g m e n t s , 2) no f i n a l j u d g m e n t s , 3) no 
j u d g m e n t d e b t o r s 1 i n t e r e s t i n t h e A l p i n e p r o p e r t i e s , and 4) bona 
f i d e p u r c h a s e r s t a t u s of O w n e r s . [ R l ] 
J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s p r o d u c e d Rule 56 e v i d e n c e which 
c r e a t e s a d i s p u t e d f a c t r e g a r d i n g J u d g m e n t D e b t o r s t r u e i d e n t i t y 
s h o w i n g t h a t J u d g m e n t D e b t o r s Fred V r e e k e n , Kur t V r e e k e n , K e i t h 
V r e e k e n , and K r i s [ C h r i s ] V r e e k e n w e r e u s i n g v a r i o u s p e r t i n e n t 
a n d m a t e r i a l b u s i n e s s n a m e s a s c a m o f l a u g e , p s e u d o n y m o u s , 
f i c t i t i o u s , and a s s u m e d n a m e s w i t h no s e p a r a t e l e g a l i d e n t i t y 
s t a t u s . [ R 4 7 0 - 5 6 9 ] 
J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s a l s o s h o w e d t h a t many of t h e 
f i c t i t i o u s b u s i n e s s n a m e s l i s t e d i n t h e j u d g m e n t p l e a d i n g s a r e 
t i e d t o s a i d J u d g m e n t D e b t o r s . [ R 1 0 9 4 , 1 7 2 3 , 1 6 6 7 ; F i r s t F e d e r a l 
F i n a n c e - R 4 8 8 , 5 0 9 - 5 1 5 ; I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n v e s t m e n t C o n f e r e n c e -
R 5 3 5 , 5 6 2 ; A r i e s + S e r v , SA - R561] J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s a r g u e d 
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t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t r u e i d e n t i t y of j u d g m e n t d e b t o r s i n t h e 3 
c o n t e s t e d j u d g m e n t s m u s t be d e t e r m i n e d i n t h i s c a s e a s a 
p r e c e d e n t f i n d i n g of f a c t b e f o r e t h e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s a r g u e d by 
Owners c a n be a p p l i e d and t h a t t h e r e a r e m a t e r i a l f a c t s l e f t t o 
b e d e c i d e d r e g a r d i n g t r u e i d e n t i t y , a l t e r e g o , and d e a l i n g w i t h 
o f f i c e r s a n d d i r e c t o r s of d e f a c t o c o r p o r a t i o n s when t h e i n j u r e d 
p a r t i e s h a v e no k n o w l e d g e t h e b u s i n e s s t h e y d e a l w i t h c l a i m s t o 
b e a c o r p o r a t i o n . [ R 5 7 1 - 5 7 6 ] 
J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s a l s o s u p p l i e d Rule 5 6 e v i d e n c e 
s h o w i n g K r i s [ C h r i s ] V r e e k e n — a n d n o t o n l y K e i t h V r e e k e n - - w a s 
s e r v e d w i t h p r o c e s s on behaLf of j u d g m e n t d e b t o r s i n t h e 
s e p a r a t e J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r B i e b e r and J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r Gregg 
j u d g m e n t s [ R 1 6 5 3 - 1 6 5 6 , 1 6 5 8 - 1 6 6 3 , 1 6 5 7 - 1 6 6 2 , 1 7 0 9 - 1 7 1 0 , 1 7 1 2 -
1 7 1 5 , 1 7 1 8 , 1 7 1 1 , 1 7 1 9 ] and t h a t Fred and Kur t V r e e k e n made 
g e n e r a l a p p e a r a n c e s t h r o u g h f i l i n g an a n s w e r i n t h e Rone c a s e . 
[ R 1 0 7 8 ] 
Owners moved f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t and a f t e r o r a l 
a r g u m e n t , s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t was g r a n t e d . The t r i a l j u d g e r u l e d 
t h e r e w e r e q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t i t l e t o t h e p r o p e r t y b u t no 
m a t e r i a l f a c t s l e f t f o r d e c i s i o n . [ R 6 2 3 ] Owners a s k e d f o r 
f i n a l j u d g m e n t on c e r t a i n i s s u e s p u r s u a n t t o URCP Rule 5 4 ( b ) 
w i t h o u t o p p o s i t i o n from J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s s o t h a t t h e 
i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n of t r u e i d e n t i t y c o u l d be q u i c k l y d e c i d e d on. 
a p p e a l i n t h i s c a s e . [ R 6 2 5 , 6 2 6 ] J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s d i s p u t e 
t h e j u d g e ' s r u l i n g and s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , b e l i e v i n g t h e r e a r e 
g e n u i n e m a t e r i a l f a c t s l e f t t o be d e c i d e d and t h a t Owners a r e 
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n o t e n t i t l e d t o j u d q m e n t a s a m a t t e r of law r e q a r d i n q a 
p e r m a n e n t i n j u n c t i o n p r e c l u d i n q l e v y and s a l e of t h e i r A l p i n e 
p a r c e l s by t h e J u d q m e n t C r e d i t o r s . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1: T h e r e i s e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d c r e a t i n q a 
g e n u i n e m a t e r i a l f a c t t h a t t h e V r e e k e n F a m i l y [ J u d q m e n t 
D e b t o r s ] a n d t h e i r c a m o f l a u q e l a b e l s ( f i c t i t i o u s b u s i n e s s n a m e s , 
p s e u d o n y m n s , a s s u m e d n a m e s ) a r e one and t h e s a m e . T h i s 
c o e x i s t e n t TRUE IDENTITY m a k e s a l l of t h e a s s e t s of J u d q m e n t 
D e b t o r s , w h e t h e r h e l d i n f i c t i t i o u s n a m e s o r o t h e r w i s e , s u b j e c t 
t o J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s ' j u d q m e n t l i e n s . 
POINT 2: The d o c t r i n e of TRUE IDENTITY i s a p r e c e d e n t 
f i n d i n q of f a c t r e q u i r e d b e f o r e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a n y o t h e r l e q a l 
p r i n c i p l e s , s t a t e s o r r u l e s of c o u r t . I n t e r e s t s i n r e a l p r o p e r t y 
e x i s t r e q a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r a c e r t a i n n a m e i s l i s t e d i n t h e 
j u d q m e n t f o r m i n g b a s i s f o r t h e j u d q m e n t l i e n i f t h e f i c t i t i o u s 
b u s i n e s s n a m e s and V r e e k e n F a m i l y a r e r e a l l y one and t h e s a m e . 
R e c o r d e d n o t i c e s of f e d e r a l t a x l i e n s and j u d q m e n t l i e n s c r e a t e 
a g e n u i n e q u e s t i o n of bona f i d e p u r c h a s e r s t a t u s . The q e n u i n e 
q u e s t i o n of f a c t r e q a r d i n g f u l l and f a i r h e a r i n q and newly 
d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e i s p r e s e n t e d r e q a r d i n q t h e i s s u e of s e r v i c e 
of p r o c e s s . A l s o , K r i s V r e e k e n was s e r v e d i n t h e B i e b e r and 
Gregq c a s e s of J u d q m e n t C r e d i t o r s — n o t j u s t K e i t h V r e e k e n . 
POINT 3 : Even i f t h e r e w e r e de f a c t o s e p a r a t e l e q a l 
e n t i t i e s s e t UP u s i n q a n y of t h e J u d q m e n t D e b t o r s 1 a d o p t e d 
f i c t i t i o u s b u s i n e s s n a m e s , t h e r e a r e q e n u i n e q u e s t i o n s of f a c t 
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remaining reaardinq fraudulent conveyance, a l t e r ego and 
pierc inq of corporate ve i l s , and fa i l ina to give proper not ice to 
Judgment Credi tors t h a t they were in fac t dealing with a 
corporat ion or corpora t ions . 
POINT 4: The Judqment Cred i tors ' judgment l i ens a t t a c h -
ed to r ea l property in count ies in the State of Utah from the 
t ime they were docketed in each county regard less of whether 
Rule 54b URCP appl icat ion for a declara t ion from the t r i a l court 
t h a t there was no reason for delay was requested or granted. 
Judqment l i ens are the minimum r igh t Judgment Creditors must be 
granted—even more so than prejudgment writ appl icants — when 
they have gone to the point in due process en t i t l i ng them to a 
judgment on the i r c la ims. 
POINT 5: The Owners presented defect ive a f f idav i t s 
containing only conclusory s ta tements regarding lack of 
r e q u i s i t e knowlege to support t h e i r defense of bona fide 
purchaser s t a tus - Also, copies of court records the court may 
take jud ic i a l no t ice of were inaoporor ia te submissions of 
evidence. Both the improper a f f idavi t s and the inappropr ia te 
copies of court records should be s t r icken from the case . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 : A PERSON I S RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ACTIONS 
NO MATTER WHAT LABELS HE OSES 
The a l l e n c o m p a s s i n g and p e r v a s i v e p r i n c i p l e of TRUE 
IDENTITY g o v e r n i n g t h i s c a s e and t h e l e q a l p r i n c i p l e s and r u l e s 
a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e p a r t i e s h a s b e e n p r e c e d e n t i n Utah s i n c e 1925 
when t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t of Utah i n S t a t e v . T inn in , 2 32 P 5 4 3 , 
545 (Utah 1925) a d o p t e d t h i s u n i v e r s a l r u l e : 
T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n i n l a w , e i t h e r a s t o a 
c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d i n t o by a p e r s o n u n d e r an 
a s s u m e d o r f i c t i t i o u s n a m e b e i n q v a l i d . THE 
LAW LOOKS TO THE IDENTITY OF THE INDIVI -
DUAL, AND WHEN THIS IS ESTABLISHED THE ACT 
IS BINDING UPON HIM AND OTHERS, IRRESPEC-
TIVE OF THE NAME HE HAS ASSUMED. 
T h i s p r i n c i p l e i s w e l l s u b s t a n t i a t e d by c a s e law 
t h r o u g h o u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . S e e 57 AJ2d Names S e c t i o n 6 2 . 
M o r e o v e r , i n d i v i d u a l s who do b u s i n e s s a s s o l e p r o p r i e -
t o r s u n d e r o n e o r s e v e r a l n a m e s r e m a i n o n e p e r s o n a n d , a s s u c h , 
a r e p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e f o r a l l t h e i r o b l i q a t i o n s . Thomas v C o l v i n , 
592 P2d 982 (Ok la . A D D . 1979) 
Mos t i m p o r t a n t i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s c a s e , n a m i n q a s o l e 
p r o p r i e t o r d e f e n d a n t u n d e r h i s t r a d e n a m e i s t h e s a m e a s n a m i n q 
t h e d e f e n d a n t i n d i v i d u a l l y . N a t i o n a l Sure ty Co. v Oklahoma 
P r e s b y t e r i a n C o l l e g e f o r G i r l s , 13 2 P 65 2 (Ok la . 1 9 1 2 ) , 
r e a f f i r m e d i n C o l v i n , s u p r a and Duval v Midwes t Auto C i t y , I n c . , 
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435 F. SUPP. 1381 (D. Neb. 1977) and Southern Ins. Co. v 
Consumer Ins. Agency, Inc., 442 F. SUDD 30 (E. D. La. 1977) 
In Duval, suora, the court held: 
The des ignat ion "dba" means "doinq bus iness 
as" but i s merely descr iDtive of the oerson or 
coroorat ion who does bus iness under some 
other name. Doinq bus iness under another name 
does not c rea te an en t i ty d i s t i n c t from the 
oerson operat ing the bus ines s . The individual 
who does bus iness as a sole propr ie tor under 
one or severa l names remains one Derson, 
personally l iab le for al l h is ob l iga t ions . 
Some s t a t e courts have a l tered or improved the common 
law rule in Tinnin, supra, bv ce r ta in orovis ions regarding 
personal i d e n t i t y through t h e i r c iv i l procedure ru l e s . Our Utah 
State has par t i a l ly done t h i s by orovidinq in Rule 17d, URCP, 
t h a t two or more persons assoc ia ted in bus iness - e i the r as a 
j o in t - s tock company, a par tnersh ip or other a s soc i a t i on , not 
incorporated - who t r a n s a c t bus iness under "a common name", 
whether i t comprises the names of the assoc ia ted persons or not, 
may be sued by such "common name" and any judgment obtained 
aga ins t the defendant in such case "shall bind the jo int property 
of a l l the a s s o c i a t e s " in the same manner as if a l l had been 
personally named defendants and had been sued upon t h e i r jo int 
l i a b i l i t y . 
Some s t a t e s have even spec i f ica l ly indica ted s u i t s may 
be brouqht even though t rue i den t i t y i s not known. This 
honorable Supreme Court of Utah has so indica ted in current Rule 
10a, URCP by s t a t i n g , "A party whose name i s not known shal l be 
des ignated by any name and the words 'whose t rue name i s 
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unKnown.'" 
A great d ramat i s t Shakesoeare said i t in laymen's 
language: A rose i s a rose no matter what other name you call 
i t . 
I t i s mater ia l in t h i s act ion whether or not the Vreeken 
Family or any of t h e i r members, i e . , Fred, Marilyn, Kurt, Keith 
and/or Kris [Chris] Vreeken are in fact one and the same as the 
labels they adopted and used in the conduct of t he i r bus inesses 
for if they were, under the pr inc ip les of Tinnin and Rule 17d, 
ORCP in Utah, no matter what they called themselves and no 
matter whether they mistakenly thought t h e i r bus iness en t i ty 
names were separa te and d i s t i n c t legal e n t i t i e s in the eyes of 
the law, they are the ul t imate people l iable and property held in 
any of the labels they used i s subject to execution to sa t i s fy 
any of the l i a b i l i t i e s obtained by judgments in the name of any 
of the Vreeken Family's f i c t i t i o u s bus iness names unless the 
property was purchased by a bona fide purchaser as said bona 
fide purchaser i s defined by the law of the State of Utah. 
Only a small par t of the cr iminal t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t of Fred 
and Kurt Vreeken in US Utah Dis t r i c t Court was introduced into 
evidence in support of Judgment Credi tor ' s display of disputed 
genuine mater ia l f a c t s . And tha t i s al l t ha t was necessary 
because summary judgment i s not a full hearing on the mer i t s . 
In summary judgment, one need only one competent sworn 
s ta tement under oath to d ispute the averments on the other s ide 
of the controversy and crea te an i s s u e of fac t . Hardy v 
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Prudential Insurance Co., 76 3 P2d 7 61 (Utah 198 8) But there 
cer ta in ly was suf f ic ien t evidence out in to the record to show 
there are qenuine mater ia l f ac t s le f t to be decided. 
Bank accounts were controlled by Kurt and Fred Vreeken. 
[R476-477] Fred, h is wife Marilyn A,, son Kurt and son Keith 
were on ARIES CONSULTING USA LTD. checkinq account s iqnature 
cards for example. [R494-495, 497] Kurt concocted and created 
numerous names, many of them even personal names, f i c t i o n s , 
people who did not even ex i s t [R542-16 to 11 reverse s i d e ] , 
which he used as pseudonymns for himself and to conduct 
bus ines s . [R515-556] He then would make al l of the dec i s ions 
reqardinq "business" t r a n s a c t i o n s between these names [R553-
554 as examples] , pull out the approorai te rubber stamp which he 
kept in a drawer a t h is Lehi off ice , and plunk the stamp where 
s iqna tures were needed. [R515-556, 480, 484, 536] They 
became known as his l i t t l e squ iqq l ies . [R489] Indeed, h is own 
s iqna ture i s undecipherable unless you had personal knowledqe of 
h i s s igna tu re . 
Kurt was ac t ing l ike a Captain Kirk maneuvering a q iant 
monopoly game. However, he was using r ea l money from rea l 
people. There was no arms length dealing whatsoever. He was 
most of the show. He even said in h is own words, "This whole 
th ing , l ike I sa id , was a f i c t iona l th inq . I t was an academic 
exe rc i s e . I wasn' t working. I wasn' t employed anywhere. I was 
ju s t - - i t was an academic exe rc i se s imi lar to what I 'd done in 
school." [521-9] 
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Money used t o buy t h e two o a r c e l s of DroDerty in AlDine, 
Utah in t h e name of RED DEER INVESTMENTS, which o a r c e l s Owners 
a r e t r y i n g t o keep in t h i s law s u i t , was t a k e n from t h e FIRST 
FEDERAL FINANCE a c c o u n t a t D e s e r e t Bank in Lehi , Utah. 
[R552(back s i d e ] FIRST FEDERAL FINANCE i s one of t h e names 
a q a i n s t whom judgment was o b t a i n e d by a l l 3 Judament C r e d i t o r s . 
[R1094, 1723, 1667] The c o n n e c t i o n i s t h e r e and t h e l i a b i l i t y of 
Owners DroDerty t o s a t i s f y t h e judgments of Judgment Debtors i s 
t h e r e . 
Some of t h e numerous f i c t i t i o u s names used by t h e 
Judgment Debtors were : 
TESCHEN ENTERPRISES [R478] 
SAAR AKKA ABESHR, LTD. [482-483] 
E'TRANGER COMPAGNIE [R486-420 
FIRST FEDERAL FINANCE [R488] 
RAM-TECH [R490] 
RED DEER INVESTMENTS [R490, 501-503] 
ARIES CONSULTING USA LTD. [R494] 
K. R. VREEKEN ENTERPRISES [R496] 
ARIES CONSULTING CORP. [R5 04] 
QUASAR INTERNATIONAL LTD. [R513- 519(back side)] 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES, LTD [R520] 
CHERKESSK ENTERPRISES [R522(back side] 
CM SYSTEMS [R524] 
TESCHEN FINANCIAL INTERNATIONAL [R524] 
AUDENTES FORTUNA JUVAT [R530] 
KOVAN AMBERGETS [R531] 
QUESSO RESEARCH INSTITUTE, LTD. [R531] 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CONFERENCE [R535] 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CONFERENCE [R535] 
FIRST INTERNATIONAL BANK OF GIBRALTER [R534] 
GYROSYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL [R5 36] 
GODWIN-AUSTEN CO. LTD. [R536(back side)] 
TECH STAR, LTD. [R537] 
Some personal names concocted and used were: 
SAMMY GNEI [R537] 
ESKO TRUEHAND [R539] 
RALLO NYBERG [R54 2] 
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THOMAS DEAVER [542] 
RALPH PEEL [R542(reverse)] 
KEVIN DALLY [R542(reverse)], 
just to give a representative sample. 
K u r t V r e e k e n b o r r o w e d money from and M a r i l y n V r e e k e n 
g o t money from SAAR AKKA ABESHR, LTD. [ R 4 8 3 ] Kur t V r e e k e n 
s i g n e d f o r E'TRANGER. [ R 4 8 6 ] FIRST FEDERAL FINANCE o b t a i n e d 
a l l of i t s money t h r o u g h t h e V r e e k e n s and t h a t money was 
t r a n s f e r r e d b a c k a n d f o r t h . [ R 4 8 7 , 5 0 8 - 5 1 5 ] 
K u r t p u r c h a s e d a h o u s e [ R 5 0 1 - 5 0 3 i n A l p i n e i n t h e RED 
DEER INVESTMENTS n a m e , Kur t p u r c h a s e d a n o t h e r home a t 362 
Wes t 900 N o r t h , L e h i , Utah i n t h e K. R. VREEKEN ENTERPRISES 
n a m e . [ R 5 0 3 ] They a l s o p u r c h a s e d a b u i l d i n g l o t a t S i l v e r Fork 
[ R 5 0 3 ] , QUASAR INTERNATIONAL b o u g h t a $ 1 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 D a t s u n f o r 
M a r i l y n A. V r e e k e n [ R 5 1 3 - 5 1 8 ] r $ 8 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 was u s e d from t h e 
FIRST FEDERAL FINANCE b a n k a c c o u n t t o p a y off a home i n Cove 
P o i n t , S a l t Lake C o u n t y , Utah l i v e d i n by Fred V r e e k e n . [ R 5 1 3 -
5 2 3 ] An Audi 5 0 0 0 , D a t s u n King Cab and e v e n a b o a t w e r e a l s o 
p u r c h a s e d from i n v e s t o r money and u s e d by t h e V r e e k e n s . [ R 5 1 5 -
5 1 6 , 5 5 3 ] 
K u r t made d e c i s i o n s t o move money from o n e b a n k 
a c c o u n t t o a n o t h e r [ R 5 2 6 ] and g o t a t a x i c a b d r i v e r t o s i g n 
d o c u m e n t s when he* v i s i t e d t h e T u r k s a n d C a i c o s I s l a n d s . [ R 5 2 8 ] 
IF a l l of t h e a b o v e e v i d e n c e , w h i c h i s o n l y a s m a l l 
p o r t i o n of t h e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t Kur t and Fred 
V r e e k e n , d o e s n o t r a i s e s u f f i c i e n t q u e s t i o n s t o p l a c e t h e 
q u e s t i o n of t r u e i d e n t i t y i n t h e c a t e g o r y of an u n d e c i d e d 
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genuine mater ia l fac t , then our system of ju s t i ce i s gravely 
lacking. 
The US Federal Court spent over $80,000.00 in prosecut -
ing t h e i r cr iminal charges aga ins t jus t 2 of the Vreeken Family. 
I t was a complex task requir ing the ass imi la t ion of records from 
many places , many banks, many depos i to r s . I t i s a prime 
example of the meaning of the following s ta tement : 
The use of f i c t i t i o u s names i s not to be 
encouraged since i t lends i t s e l f too readi ly to 
fraud because of the concealment involved and i s 
l i ke ly to be used against the public i n t e r e s t or 
against pr iva te i n t e r e s t s , pa r t i cu l a r l y those 
of c red i to rs or other in te res ted p a r t i e s . 65 CJS 
Names S e c t i o n 9 ( 1 ) , n o t e 2 7 . 5 [Peak v S t a t e , 163 
NE2d 584 ( I n d i a n a ) ] 
Our case i s a c l a s s i c example of white collar persons 
with some education and a r t i cu l a t enes s manipulating the use of 
i den t i t y through labels to mess up the legal system and defraud 
and improperly take and use money from o thers . The real 
cu lpr i t s are the Vreekens. But the rea l problems i t has 
generated are among those who have been effected by the i r 
a c t i ons . Their schemes have caused numerous problems includ-
ing t h i s one between people who put money into t he i r schemes 
and people who bought property the Judgment Debtors had t i t l e to 
when they were using said money. 
The Judgment Debtors t ruly were using labels as a tool of 
concealment. 
POINT 2: TRUE IDENTITY DETERMINES HOW OTHER LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES, RULES AND STATUTES ARE APPLIED 
For our system to t ruly promote j u s t i c e , the effects of 
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t rue i den t i t y must implement a t the t ime of the ac t c rea t inq 
l i ab i l t y or the t ime when judgment i s rendered—not a t a t ime 
subsequent . Owners would t ry and convince the court to adopt a 
policy precluding implementation of the t ime honored and sacred 
"true iden t i ty" doct r ine un t i l a jud ic ia l determinat ion i s made 
t h a t in fac t one person i s t ruly also another or t ha t many 
camoflauge labels are really a ce r ta in group of people. They 
would have you adopt a rule allowing those who use f i c t i t i o u s 
names as tools of concealment and confusion to run fancy free 
and hog wild for days , months and even years (as in t h i s case 7 
years) before a s s e t s concealed (if s t i l l in ex is tence) can be 
la tched onto to sa t i s fy a l i a b i l i t y owed by the t rue perpe t ra tor 
leaving those who were i n i t i a l l y injured in the lurch. 
They would also have you adopt a rule allowing th i rd 
p a r t i e s to do the same—run fancy free and without r e s t r a i n t UP 
and down the freeway of explo i ta t ion taking a s s e t s out of order 
of p r io r i t y and buying and sel l ing property for a prof i t when 
t h a t property real ly should be subject to a l ien but because the 
record t i t l e holder label i s not the same as the t rue owner, no 
l ien can a t t ach un t i l a jud ic ia l determinat ion recognizes the 
fac t t h a t the record t i t l e holder label and the t rue owner are one 
and the same. 
To adopt such a rule i s a mis take . I t c r ea t e s a ready 
too l for the deceiver . Those l ike the Judgment Debtors can run 
wild as the Vreekens did, c rea te havoc and then leave those they 
have effected lurching in the rubble of t h e i r des t ruc t ive 
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hurricane of abuse. 
How should t rue i den t i t y effect the re la t ionsh ips of 
th i rd p a r t i e s and r igh t s of p r io r i ty between them? 
When a man uses a label to t r a n s a c t bus iness or purchase 
property, a l l labels he uses are a t the f i r s t moment he adopts 
and uses them, t ruly him and him only. The leqal re la t ionsh ip 
between tha t portion of him tha t i s usinq a label for outward 
appearance iden t i f i ca t ion should not be considered separate in 
any way from tha t port ion of him t h a t i s usinq his correc t name. 
How does t ha t effect leqal r e l a t ionsh ips , r iqh t s and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and the appl icat ion of various legal pr inciples 
in t h i s case? 
Interest in Real Property 
Owners would arque t h a t because the records of the 
recorder do not re f lec t any l iens on the surface of the records 
a t tach ing to t h e i r Alpine parcels in favor of the labels Judqment 
Credi tors obtained judgments aga ins t , they are home sco t t f ree. 
They argue t h a t in order for t h e i r property to be incumbered with 
any of the judgment l i ens of the Judgment Credi tors , judqments 
needed to be obtained on paper in the name of Red Deer 
Investments or Red Deer Inves tments , SA. But tha t i s not the 
jus t answer to a complex and all pervasive concept. 
The concept and t ru th i s : When someone i s en t i t l ed to a 
judgment aga ins t a person, the i n t e r e s t s of t ha t person wherever 
s i tua ted and under whatever label desiqnated are subject to the 
l ien of t ha t judqment. I t may be long af ter the judqment i s 
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entered before t h a t t rue fac t comes to l iqh t or before act ion i s 
taken to a s s e r t r i gh t s aga ins t those i n t e r e s t s , but the l ien s t i l l 
has to be t h e r e . Otherwise, people l ike the Vreeken Family can 
get away with almost anything by merely labeling t h e i r bus iness 
a c t i v i t i e s or the purchase of r ea l property somethinq other than 
t h e i r t rue legal name, and others can also take advantaqe of the 
s i t ua t i on and purchase property for an investment or whatever a t 
the expense of those who were primari ly injured,. 
What i s the comoensatinq and balancinq leqal pr inciple 
p ro tec t inq the r i g h t s of o thers in t h i s s i tua t ion? 
I t i s the pr inciple of bona fide purchaser . A person 
purchasing for value without knowledqe (as tha t knowledge i s 
defined by the law), i s exempt from the sometimes harsh 
consequences of buying property with undisclosed l i ens on i t . 
That i s a doct r ine which has evolved down throuqh hundreds of 
years of human experience and which i s even codified by our own 
Utah Legis la ture . If the person can prove bona fide purchaser 
s t a t u s , they can keep the property free and clear of any 
l inger ing undisclosed l i ens on i t . 
But if the purchasers do not exerc i se t h a t degree of duty 
required of them to check on fac t s which would tend to cause 
alarm to a reasonable man, they can lose t h e i r claim to bona fide 
purchaser s t a t u s . In t h i s case . Owners were put on not ice 
through recorded documents oer ta in inq to t h e i r Alpine parcels of 
l ien problems. Numerous IRS Federal Tax Liens were filed 
l i s t i n g Fred and Kurt Vreeken as doing bus iness under numerous 
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f i c t i t i o u s bus iness names. [R455-460] An addi t iona l not ice was 
recorded of record ident i fying speci f ica l ly FIRST FEDERAL 
FINANCE and RED DEER INVESTMENTS as two of the f i c t i t i o u s 
bus iness names of Fred and Kurt Vreeken. [R451-452] 
These above two not ices of record were const ruct ive 
not ice to all persons "of t h e i r contents" according to our s t a t e 
recording s t a t u t e s . 57-3-2(1) OCA 1953 For Owners to take 
further s teps to purchase the Alpine parcels af ter having been 
warned by the above two no t i ce s , was purely a t t he i r own r i sk . 
Johnson v Bell, 66 6 P2d 3 08, 310 (Utah 1983), McGarry v 
Thompson, 201 P2d 898 (Utah 1948, Pender v Dowse, 265 P2d 644, 
64 9 (Utah 1954), Diversified Equities, Inc. v American Savings 
and Loan Association, 739 P2d 1133 (Ut. Ct. ADD. 1987) The 
inclusion of these two no t ices in the evidence of Judament 
Credi tors presented in opposi t ion to Owners motion for summary 
judgment created a not icable genuine mater ia l fact lef t for 
fac tua l determinat ion by a jury. 
Rule 54b Inclusion of All Parties 
Owners would also contend tha t s ince judgments were 
obtained on paper aga ins t only par t of the defendants named in 
t h e i r complaints , the Judgment Creditors did not have any 
judgment l iens and therefore t h e i r execution was improper. They 
contend Rule 54b URCP mandates spec ia l procedures such as in 
t h i s case requir ing the judge to determine there i s no jus t 
reason for delay in enter ing judament aga ins t only par t of the 
defendants . 
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Even t a k i n q t h i s a r q u m e n t a t f a c e v a l u e , t h e f a c t t h a t 
t h e c a m o f l a u g e l a b e l s u s e d by t h e V r e e k e n s t o c o n d u c t b u s i n e s s 
a r e i n f a c t o n e and t h e s a m e and a r e a c t u a l l y t h e a l t e r e q o o r 
c o u n t e r p a r t of t h e V r e e k e n s d e f e a t s t h e a r q u m e n t . If a l l t h o s e 
n a m e d a s d e f e n d a n t s a r e f o u n d t o be o n e a n d t h e s a m e a s f a r a s 
l i a b i l i t y and i d e n t i t y g o , t h e n a l l of t h e d e f e n d a n t s h a v e i n f a c t 
b e e n a d j u d i c a t e d and a j u d g m e n t r e n d e r e d a q a i n s t t h e m . 
Rule 54 m u s t be a p p l i e d , j u s t a s e v e r y o t h e r l e q a l 
d o c t r i n e , a f t e r a p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t r u e i d e n t i t y b e c a u s e 
a p p l y i n g t h e r u l e t o o n l y o u t w a r d a p p e a r a n c e i s n o t q e t t i n q a t 
t h e h e a r t . To c r e a t e a f a n t a s y t h a t t r u t h i s r e a l l y n o t w h a t i t 
i s i s t o p r o m u l g a t e i n j u s t i c e . T h i s i s a p r i m e e x a m p l e w h e r e 
r u l e s a n d p r i n c i p l e s m u s t b e a p p l i e d f o l l o w i n g a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
t r u e i d e n t i t y when a q u e s t i o n of t r u e i d e n t i t y i s r a i s e d . If we 
w e r e t o s a y t h a t e v e n t h o u q h t h e f i c t i t i o u s n a m e s u n d e r wh ich 
j u d g m e n t w e r e o b t a i n e d a r e r e a l l y i n f a c t t h e s a m e a s a l l of t h e 
V r e e k e n F a m i l y m e m b e r s b u t t h e p o i n t i n t i m e when a c o u r t s a y s 
on p a p e r t h a t t h a t i s t r u e i s t h e p o i n t i n t i m e t h e b e n e f i t s and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s s t a r t t o a c c r u e , we a r e m i s s i n q t h e b o a t . 
THE TIME WHEN THE BENEFITS AND RESPONSIBILITIES MUST 
START TO FLOW IS THE POINT IN TIME WHEN THE FICTITIOUS NAMES 
WERE ADOPTED AND USED. No m a t t e r w h a t we l a b e l o u r s e l v e s , i t 
s h o u l d n o t c h a n q e t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y No. 1 h a s t o s o c i e t y and i t 
a l s o s h o u l d n o t c h a n g e HOW No. l ' s ACTIONS UNDER HIS OWN 
NAME OR UNDER ANY LABELS HE CHOOSES TO STICK TO HIM IN THE 
FORM OF CAMOFLAUGED IDENTITY. The o n e t r u t h r e m a i n s : He i s 
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who he i s no matter what he chooses to call himself and the 
rules of socie ty should not be effected by his freedom to call 
himself by other names. 
Service of Process 
Owners would further hope the court would adopt the view 
there are no valid judgments because the cons t i tu t iona l due 
process requirement of not ice (service of process or otherwise) 
has not been effected in any of Judgment Creditors1 3 separate 
c a s e s . They argue t h a t Keith and Kris [Chris] Vreeken were the 
individuals upon whom service of process in the 3 cases was 
made. They argue t ha t such process was not effect ive under 
Rule 4 DRCP pe r ta in ing to serv ice of summons and complaints . 
They further argue t h a t res judicata appl ies regarding defect ive 
serv ice of process in a l l 3 cases . 
Owners' contention i s groundless for two different 
r easons : 
A. F i r s t , once again if t rue i den t i t y determinat ion 
shows Kurt, Fred, Marilyn, Keith and Kris [Chris] Vreeken to be 
one and the same as the f i c t i t i o u s bus iness labels they 
conducted bus iness under and held t i t l e to property under, then 
serv ice upon Keith and Kris Vreeken was the same as service 
upon al l of the f i c t i t i o u s names and other a s s o c i a t e s under Rule 
17d ORCP, s u p r a . 
B. In order for res judicata to take effect , two 
necessary elements are 1) the pa r t i e s must be the same and 2) 
the i s sue must have been fully and fair ly l i t i ga t ed before the 
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i s s u e c a n be p r e c l u d e d i n a s u b s e q u e n t p r o c e e d i n g . Mel Trimble 
Rea l E s t a t e v Monte V i s t a Ranch, 75 8 P2d 4 51 (U tah C t . A D D . 
1988) 
1 . Owners t r y a n d a r g u e t h a t b e c a u s e i n a p r e v i o u s 
p r o c e e d i n g i n v o l v i n g J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r B. J . Rone and a n o t h e r 
c o m o e t i n g c r e d i t o r of V r e e k e n s i n a c o n t e s t o v e r p r i o r i t y of 
l i e n s t o b a n k d e p o s i t s , t h e Utah C o u r t of A p p e a l s s u s t a i n e d t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t f i n d i n q t h a t s e r v i c e of o r o c e s s on K e i t h V r e e k e n i n 
t h a t o r o c e e d i n q was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o o b t a i n j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r 
t h e p e r s o n of t h e f i c t i t i o u s n a m e d e f e n d a n t s and t h e r e f o r e Rone 
h a d no v a l i d j u d g m e n t , t h e s a m e m u s t be h e l d t r u e i n t h i s 
p r o c e e d i n g i n v o l v i n g n o t o n l y B. J . Rone b u t a l s o t w o d i f f e r e n t 
J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s Rona ld A. B i e b e r dba RAB Ranch and J a m e s E. 
G r e g g . D e m e t r o o o u l o s v Vreeken , 754 P2d 960 [ R 2 6 6 ] 
T h a t D r o c e e d i n g d i d n o t i n v o l v e t h e s a m e p a r t i e s t o t h i s 
a c t i o n o t h e r t h a n B. J . R o n e . I t p e r t a i n e d t o t h e o r i o r i t y o v e r 
a l l e g e d l i e n s b e t w e e n B. J . Rone and D e m e t r o o o u l o s . I t d i d n o t 
i n v a l i d a t e t h e j u d g m e n t a s a g a i n s t a l l o t h e r s n o r d i d i t o r e c l u d e 
a r e a d j u d i c a t i o n of t h e s a m e q u e s t i o n u n l e s s a l l e l e m e n t s 
a l l o w i n q r e s j u d i c a t a a r e p r e s e n t . The e l e m e n t s of s a m e p a r t i e s 
a n d t h e f u l l and f a i r l i t i g a t i o n of t h a t i s s u e a r e c o n t e s t e d . If 
a f u l l and f a i r l i t i g a t i o n of t h e i s s u e c a n n o t be p r o v e n i n t h i s 
a c t i o n , t h e n t h a t i s s u e i s n o t r e s j u d i c a t a i n t h i s a c t i o n . 
F i r s t , e v e n i f i t i s h e l d t h a t a f u l l and f a i r l i t i g a t i o n 
o c c u r r e d i n t h e D e m e t r o o o u l o s c a s e , t h e p a r t i e s a r e d i f f e r e n t . 
He re t h e p l a i n t i f f s a r e c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t . 
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Second, and most important, even if collateral estoppel 
is applied in this action because of the Demetropoulos decision, 
it cannot effect anyone other than B. J. Rone's judgment against 
Judgment Debtors. This is so because in the Demetroupoulos 
dispute, B. J. Rone had only served Keith Vreeken was served 
process in the Demetroupoulos case BUT in the actions of 
Judgment Creditors Ronald A. Bieber and James E. Gregg another 
individual named Kris [Chris] Vreeken WAS ALSO SERVED both 
individually and as agent for numerous fictitious business names 
including FIRST FEDERAL FINANCE and there has not been one 
scrap of evidence presented by Owners in this proceeding on 
summary judgment to rebut the presumption that Kris [Chris] 
Vreeken was a proper party to receive service of process for the 
fictitious business names or for Keith, Fred, and Kurt Vreeken 
as doing business under those fictitious business names. The 
only grounds Owners rely upon for their contention that service 
was not effected and therefore jurisdiction was not obtained by 
all 3 Judgment Creditors is the Demetroupoulos decision. 
Presumption of Validity of Service 
The real law in the State of Utah says there is a 
presumption that the returns of service of summons, complaints 
and other pleadings are true until rebutted by clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary. Carnes v Carnes, 66 8 P2d 
555, 557 (Utah 1983) The returns of service on Kris [Chris] 
Vreeken showing service of the fictitious business names as well 
as individual service upon Kris himself [R1653-1656, 1658-1659, 
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1663; 1709-1710, 1712-1718] r a i s e a qenuine mater ia l fact in 
t h i s ac t ion requi r ing a plenary hearing to determine va l id i ty of 
process and ju r i sd i c t ion before judgment on t h a t ground can be 
rendered in favor of Owners. Kris [Chris] Vreeken i s a 
d i f ferent person from Keith Vreeken. He i s not Keith Vreeken. 
The t r i a l court erred in overlooking t h i s c ruc ia l point in ruling 
in favor of summary judgment aga ins t Judgment Creditors Bieber 
and Greqg not taking in to account t ha t Kris Vreeken i s a 
d i f ferent person upon whom process was served. 
B. J. Rone's claim i s the only claim which can be 
effected by the Demetroupoulos dec is ion and t h a t can only 
happen if the p a r t i e s are the same and the matter was fully and 
fa i r ly l i t i g a t e d . But i t was not . New evidence i s beinq 
uncovered as t ime goes on and the a c t i v i t i e s of the Vreekens 
(Judgment Debtors) become more known. Judgment Credi tors 
presented evidence in opposi t ion to summary judgment on the 
quest ion of full and fa i r l i t i g a t i o n and new evidence by showing 
a Trust Deed with Keith Vreeken's s ignature on behalf of Red 
Deer Investments with an acknowlegment by a notary public t ha t 
he declared himself to be an off icer of t ha t bus iness [R447-449] 
executed April 19, 1983, jus t 6 days before he was served with 
summons and complaint in the B. J. Rone ac t ion . [R1073] This 
family was a l l mixed UP in t h i s . There i s no quest ion about 
t h a t , and to c rea te the f ic t ion t ha t Keith Vreeken was not a 
running ac t ive member in these operat ions i s a t r ave s ty on 
j u s t i c e . 
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Judqment Creditors also noted tha t the or ig inal t r i a l 
judge in the DemetrouDOulos d ispute held in one of his findings 
t ha t "none of the defendants in the i n s t an t case were, at any 
re levant t ime , bujs iness e n t i t i e s other than sole propr ie torships 
of individual defendants operat ing under assumed names." [R738 
(Civil No. 63505)] 
Judgment Creditors also have in record the aff idavi t of 
Neal E. Colledge, a former INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CONFER-
ENCE rep resen ta t ive for the t e r r i t o r y of Utah Sta te , who 
t e s t i f i e s t ha t not only Kris [Chris] but also Keith worked r ight 
along with Kurt and Fred Vreeken a t t h e i r operat ion headquarters 
in Lehi, Utah producing a newslet ter for i nves to r s , sending out 
correspondence and checks and using computers. [R596-597] 
Judgment Credi tors also have in record par t of the 
cr iminal proceedings in US Federal Utah Dis t r i c t Court 
ind ica t ing Keith Vreeken had his s ignature on the checking 
account of ARIES CONSULTING USA LTD. [R494-495, 497] 
All of these i tems of evidence bring up quest ions of 
genuine mater ia l f ac t s lef t to be decided. 
Is new evidence to be looked a t? Is j u s t i ce to be 
pursued? The rule of law must be t ha t i t can, t ha t i t will be 
looked a t and used to c rea te solut ions based upon t ru th as the 
t ru th unfolds. Even B. J. Rone i s en t i t l ed to his t ime to prove 
Keith Vreeken was a proper individual to effect not ice to 
Judgment Debtors in h is case aga ins t them. 
This honorable court said jus t in August 1988: 
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Courts cannot weigh disputed mater ia l f ac t s in 
rulinq on summary judgment motions . . .; i t i s 
of no moment t h a t the evidence on one side 
may appear to be strong or even compelling . . 
.; i t only t akes one competent sworn s ta tement 
under oath to d ispute the averments on the 
other s ide of the controversy and crea te an 
i s sue of fac t . . . [addi t iona l case c i t a t i on 
o m i t t e d ] . Hardy v Prudential Insurance Co., 
763 P2d 761 (Utah 1988) 
And in addi t ion to the above evidence in the record 
presented by Judgment Credi tors , the fac tua l quest ion of t rue 
i d e n t i t y of all p a r t i e s concerned cannot but outweigh any 
cons idera t ion for summary judgment. If a l l of the Vreeken 
Family are in fac t the a l t e r ego and vice versa of the f i c t i t i o u s 
bus iness names they appropriated and used, what can j u s t i c e say 
other than to declare se rv ice proper and complete to obtain 
ju r i sd i c t ion in compliance with due process requirements of 
no t i ce . Rather than r e c i t i n g the same references to the record 
reqarding the overenvelooing quest ion of t rue i d e n t i t y r ec i t ed in 
Point 1 of t h i s brief, reference i s respectful ly drawn to the 
same r e c i t a t i o n s of the record on pages 11-14 of t h i s brief. 
We should c rea te be t t e r law and be t t e r governinq 
p r i n c i p l e s . We should be ge t t ing b e t t e r in devis ing a t ruly fa i r 
and balanced system in our cour t s . We should learn from the 
pas t—not l ive in i t . This r equ i res reso lu teness and unwavering 
determinat ion to do what 's r igh t for the panoramic view — not for 
a nears ighted short view of the moment or for expediency 's sake. 
The panoramic view taking in al l of soc ie ty and i t s long range 
i n t e r ac t i on with each other requ i res a doctr ine recoqnizinq 
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i d e n t i t y f o r w h a t i t i s and d i s a l l o w i n g an a l t e r a t i o n of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of No. 1 o r o t h e r s a f f e c t e d by 
u n i l a t e r a l a d o p t i o n of c a m o f l a u g e l a b e l s by No. 1 . S p e c i a l 
p r i v i l e g e s s h o u l d n o t f low t o a n y o n e b e c a u s e of t h e u n i l a t e r a l 
a d o p t i o n of c a m o g l a u g e l a b e l s by an i n d i v i d u a l , a g r o u p of 
i n d i v i d u a l s , o r a s i n t h i s c a s e , by a c i r c l e of i m m e d i a t e f a m i l y 
m e m b e r s . 
POINT 3 : EVEN LEGAL ENTITIES CAN BE PIERCED 
L o g i c a l men f o r h u n d r e d of y e a r s h a v e r e a s o n e d t h a t 
f r a u d and d e c e i t a b r o g a t e a n y b e n e f i t s n o r m a l l y a v a i l a b l e t o t h e 
p e r p e t r a t o r s . T h i s l o g i c h a s b e e n a d o p t e d by o u r own s t a t e . 
Even t h o u g h a p e r s o n i s n o r m a l l y e n t i t l e d t o a d o p t and u s e 
a s s u m e d n a m e s , o r form c o r p o r a t i o n s o r p a r t n e r s h i p s which t h e 
law n o r m a l l y r e c o g n i z e s w i t h s e p a r a t e l e g a l i d e n t i t y * i f a p e r s o n 
a b u s e s t h e s e r i g h t s t h r o u g h f r a u d , he can l o s e t h e n o r m a l 
p r i v i l e g e s of n a m e u s e o r s e p a r a t e l e g a l i d e n t i t y and be s u b j e c t 
t o f u l l l i a b i l i t y f o r h i s a c t s and t h e a c t s of p r e s u m e d 
c o r p o r a t i o n s and p a r t n e r s h i p s . Our own c o u r t ' s a d d r e s s t o t h i s 
p o i n t r e g a r d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n (Ru le 17d URCP) h a s a l r e a d y b e e n 
c i t e d on p a g e 10 of t h i s b r i e f r e g a r d i n g Rule 17d , ORCP. 
T h e r e a r e o t h e r s t a t u t e s a n d l e g a l d o c t r i n e s which 
a d d r e s s t h i s p o i n t i n t h e S t a t e of U t a h . Four of t h e m a r e t h i s : 
1 . A s s u m e d n a m e u s e a g e . 
At common l a w , p e r s o n s may e n j o y a l l l e g a l 
p r i v i l e g e s u n d e r a s s u m e d n a m e s u n l e s s a s s u m -
ed f o r t h e p u r p o s e t o d e f r a u d o t h e r s . And, 
i n d i v i d u a l s o r p a r t n e r s h i p s may a l s o u s e 
a s s u m e d o r f i c t i o n a l n a m e s p r o v i d e d t h e 
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purpose for so doinq i s not a fraudulent desiqn 
or for the in t en t to injure o the r s . 57 AJ2d 
Names Sections 62, 9(1) & 64 
2. Fraudulent Conveyances Act. 
The Fraudulent Conveyances Act in our s t a t e has been 
enacted to p ro tec t aga ins t fraud. The provision of the old 
Fraudulent Conveyances Act in effect when the alleqed improper 
execut ions were levied [Section 25-1-15(2) OCA 1953, as 
amended], provided: 
May, as aqciinst any person, except a purchas -
er for f a i r considera t ion without knowledqe of 
the fraud a t the t ime of the purchase . . . (2) 
d is regard the conveyance, and a t t ach , or levy 
execution upon, the property conveyed. 
The 1988 chanqes to tha t ac t , althouqh a l te r inq wordinq, 
s t i l l provides for the same ac t ion . The only insola t ion aga ins t 
fraudulent conveyance declara t ion i s proof of bona fide 
purchaser s t a t u s . 25-6-9 OCA 1953, as amended 
3. Alter ego and pierc inq corporate v e i l s . 
To deal with unfai rness when a person or persons 
unfairly use corporate forms to do bus iness , the doct r ine of 
a l t e r ego and p ierc inq corporate ve i l s has evolved. This s t a t e , 
in continuing to sus t a in the doct r ine of a l t e r eqo and corporate 
ve i l p ie rc ing , recent ly held such pierc ing i s jus t i f ied when: 1) 
the re i s such a uni ty of i n t e r e s t and ownership t h a t the separa te 
p e r s o n a l i t i e s of the corporat ion and the indiv idual no lonqer 
e x i s t , v i z . , the corporat ion i s , in fac t , the a l te r eqo of one or a 
few ind iv idua ls ; and 2) the observance of the corporate form 
would sanct ion a fraud, promote i n ju s t i c e , or an inequi table 
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r e s u l t would f o l l o w . S a l t Lake C i t y Corp. v . J a m e s C o n s t r u c t o r s , 
I n c . , 761 P2d 42 (U tah C t . A D D . S e p t e m b e r 7, 1988) 
Owners c l a i m t h a t s o m e of t h e f i c t i t i o u s b u s i n e s s n a m e s 
a d o o t e d by t h e J u d g m e n t D e b t o r s w e r e c o r p o r a t i o n s . Even i f a 
d e f a c t o s e p a r a t e l e g a l e n t i t y i s m i r r o r e d on t h e o u t s i d e , 
d o c t r i n e s of law e s t a b l i s h e d t o o r e s e r v e f i d e l i t y i n b u s i n e s s 
r e l a t i o n s h i o s r a t h e r t h a n f r a u d , j u s t i c e r a t h e r t h a n i n j u s t i c e and 
e q u i t y r a t h e r t h a n i n e q u i t y d e f e a t t h e s e d e f e n s e s . 
F a i l u r e t o o b s e r v e c o r p o r a t e f o r m a l i t i e s ( a s i s i n d i c a t e d 
i n t h e t e s t i m o n y of K u r t V r e e k e n i n t h e F e d e r a l C o u r t t r a n s c r i o t 
[ R 5 1 5 - 5 5 6 ] w h e r e h e t e s t i f i e s h e made a l l of t h e d e c i s i o n s , j u s t 
p u l l e d o u t h i s t r u s t y s q u i g g l i e s from h i s d r a w e r [R5 36] and 
s t a m p e d t h e p e r t i n e n t r u b b e r s t a m p on t h e s i q n a t u r e l i n e , many 
of w h i c h w e r e n o t e v e n r e a l p e o p l e [ R 5 3 7 , 5 4 2 ] ) , s e t UP t h i s 
g e n u i n e f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n . Kur t t e s t i f i e d he c r e a t e d Red Deer 
I n v e s t m e n t s h i m s e l f . [ R 5 0 2 , 5 4 9 - 5 5 0 ] S i p h o n i n g of c o r p o r a t e 
f u n d s t o buy h o m e s , c a r s , b u i l d i n g l o t s , and e v e n b o a t s f o r 
p e r s o n a l u s e [ R 5 0 1 - 5 0 3 , 5 1 3 - 2 3 , 5 5 3 ] , non f u n c t i o n i n g of a n y 
o f f i c e r s o r d i r e c t o r s ( K u r t and Fred seem t o c o n t r o l a s i s s e e n 
by t h e t e s t i m o n y of Alv in Schow, D e s e r e t Bank O f f i c e r ) [ R 4 9 2 -
5 0 0 ] , t h e u s e of t h e c o r p o r a t i o n a s a f a c a d e f o r o p e r a t i o n s of 
t h e d o m i n a n t s t o c k h o l d e r o r s t o c k h o l d e r s [ R 4 7 3 - 4 8 4 , 4 9 2 - 5 0 4 , 
5 1 5 - 5 5 6 ] , t h e u s e of t h e e n t i t y i n p r o m o t i n g i n j u s t i c e o r f r a u d 
(a f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n b e i n g s e t up o n c e a g a i n by t h e F e d e r a l C o u r t 
t e s t i m o n y of b a n k c a r d s i n K u r t and Fred V r e e k e n ' s n a m e s [ R 4 7 3 -
4 8 4 , 4 9 2 - 5 0 0 ] , r u b b e r s i q n a t u r e s t a m p s p u l l e d o u t t o a f f i x t o 
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documents [R484, 535-536] , dec i s ions being made without board 
of d i rec to r meetings [R518, 520, 525(reverse) , 527, comingling 
funds as t e s t i f i e d by spec ia l IRS agent Kent W. Davis [R505-
514] , s e t t i n g UD what were couched as funds back and forth 
purchase of the Alpine proper t i es by Kurt Vreeken in the name of 
Red Deer Investment from funds in Fi rs t Federal Finance bank 
accounts , ge t t ing a t ax icab dr iver to sign documents he had 
never seen before when Kurt got off the plan in the Turks and 
Caicos Is lands [R528] r a i s e s genuine mater ia l fac t ques t ions 
requi r ing a plenary hearing before a fact finding jury. Could 
the re t ruly be a more c l a s s i c ind ica t ion of a l t e r ego? See the 
good d i scuss ion on a l t e r ego in our Utah case of Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P2d 782, 786-787 (Utah Ct. ADD, 198-7). 
4. Ignorance of Corporate S ta tus . 
Thirdly, if you don ' t know you are dealing with a 
supposed corporat ion, the d i r ec to r s and off icers are personally 
l i ab l e . RMS Corp. v. Baldwin, 576 P2d 881, 882 (Utah 1978). 
b) Judgments may be obtained aga ins t John & Jan Does. 
Our Rule 10a), URCP, provides in par t , "A party whose name i s 
not known shall be designated by any name and the words 'whose 
t rue name i s unknown." In an act ion in rem unknown pa r t i e s 
shal l be designated as 'a l l unknown persons who claim any 
i n t e r e s t in the sub jec t -mat te r of t h i s ac t ion ." 
Consis tent with t h i s ru le , the general rule in the United 
Sta tes i s t ha t a person may sue or be sued in any name he 
a s s u m e s (67A CJS P a r t i e s 1 1 4 , D P . 9 3 6 - 9 3 7 ) . And t h e , "law i s 
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l i be ra l in permi t t ing the party to subs t i t u t e the ident i f ied 
person for f i c t i t i o u s defendants while the case i s pending in 
which event the person so ident i f ied i s deemed to have been 
party from the beginning." 67A CJS Parties 115, n. 46, o. 939 
Accordingly, any contention by Owners tha t the judg-
ments aga ins t Kris [Chris] and Keith Vreeken personally are 
invalid i s erroneous. 
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Collateral to the main i s sue of TRUE IDENTITY in t h i s 
case i s the mistaken a s se r t ion by Owners t ha t judgment l i ens in 
Utah do not a t tach when the judgment i s docketed and filed in 
the office of the clerk of the d i s t r i c t court . Owners misquote 
and use cases which can be d is t inguished in t ry ing to manipulate 
Utah s t a t u t e to requi re something more than signing and entry of 
judgments before they a t tach as judgment l i ens . 
A judgment i s a judgment and can we t r u s t what the 
l eg i s l a tu re has s ta ted in uniquivocal and clear language? 
Owners misuse Kennedy v. New Era Industries, Inc., 600 
P2d 534, 536-37 (Utah 1979) because t ha t was a case determining 
what was necessary before the Supreme Court would en te r ta in 
appeal—not when does a judgment l ien a t t ach . The 
Arizona Farmers Prod. Assoc, v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson, 
535 P2d 33 (Az. Ct. of ADD. 1975) case also i s d i s t ingu ishab le . 
That case involved a default judgment of 2 out of 3 claims—not 
judgments on al l c la ims. 
The Salina v. Star B., Inc., 731 P2d 1290 (Ct. of ADD. 
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Kansas 1987) case also i s not importable in to Utah. That case 
was decided as i t was because Kansas1 l eg i s l a tu re has mandated 
a spec i f i c procedure and s teps which must be taken to get a 
judgment l ien to a t t ach and have spelled out spec ia l r e q u i r e -
ments d i f ferent than our Utah l eg i s l a tu r e . 
Our Utah Legis la ture has passed a spec i f ic law s t a t ing 
clearly t ha t a judgment l ien a t t a c h e s , "From the t ime the 
judgment of the d i s t r i c t court or c i r c u i t court i s docketed." 
78-22-1 UCA 1953, as amended 
Our Utah Supreme Court has then in te rpre ted t h i s s t a t u t e 
saying, "It i s not the judgment i t s e l f but the docketing thereof 
which c rea t e s the l i en ." Orton \r. Adams, 444 P2d 62 (Utah 1968) 
Also, the r igh t to said l ien i s uncondi t ional and i s not subject 
to a l t e rna t ion by a court on equi table grounds. Taylor Nath'l, 
Inc. v. Jensen Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P2d 150 (Utah 1982) 
The l eg i s l a tu re never intended for judgments to remain 
in limbo without a t tach ing to r ea l property unless pleadings 
other than a judgment were s igned. I t can only be the public 
policy of t h i s s t a t e to honor s a t i s f ac t i on of judgments as soon 
as can be and not to deny a claimant h is p r i o r i t i e s due to 
fa i lure to get a s ta tement from the court t ha t i t i s ok to have 
the judgment. The judgment of the court i t se l f inherent ly 
i n d i c a t e s t h i s fac t . The Rule 5 4 ci ted by p la in t i f f s can only 
apply to appl ica t ion for appeal and to preserve co l la te ra l or 
c ross claim r igh t s of pa r t i e s—not to deny judgment l i ens from 
accruing immediately af ter judgments are docketed. 
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Arizona Farmers and Salina are badly reasoned and 
i l log ica l t rea tment of a broad and al l oervasive pr ivi lege (and 
also involve t h e i r own s t a t u t e s which are dif ferent than ours ) - - a 
pr ivi lege of al l c i t i z ens to have t h e i r judgments a t tach to 
a s s e t s of judgment debtors a t the moment judgments are rendered 
without further ado of the cour t s . That i s exactly what our Utah 
l eg i s l a tu re has mandated without equivocation for as lona as 
Section 78-22-1 has been on the s t a tu t e books of Utah, which 
has been a t l e a s t s ince 1943. 
Here we see an a t tempt in Arizona Farmers and Salina to 
plug a hole ra the r than fix the d ike . We see here a prime 
example of two di f ferent courts put t ing on bl inders and saying, 
"Ah, I see where we'll get rid of t h i s one. We'll jus t reason 
t h a t the supreme court can a l t e r the in t en t of the l eg i s la tu re 
and thus a l t e r the i n t en t of the people by construing our c iv i l 
procedure rule to c rea te a narrow corridor down which every 
judgment c red i to r must squeeze before his judgment l ien 
a t t a c h e s . Baloney! 
If t h i s kind of logic i s adopted by t h i s s t a t e , t h i s i s 
what i t will do: Every Vreeken Family who des i r e s to manipulate 
the system can readi ly do i t by merely s t ick ing on camoflauge 
l abe l s . I t will royally foul UP the system as the Vreekens have 
done for the pas t 10 years . I t will allow others to take 
advantage of the s i t ua t i on , move in and make specula t ions , buy 
and sel l property, d ispose of a s s e t s , while those who have been 
deprived of t h e i r a s s e t s have the burden of f i r s t discovering 
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who the rea l cu lpr i t s are (which may take years ) , hope they can 
obtain a judqment l ien before the IRS slaps one on without 
havinq to go to court to qet one, and qive UD or spend thousands 
of dollars and years of t ime as the Judqment Credi tors in t h i s 
case have done to a t tempt to recover t h e i r lo s ses or a t l e a s t 
par t of t h e i r l o s s e s . 
Such a logic also c rea te s quirks which should not be in 
the law. I t says , "You can qet a judgment, but you be t t e r be 
careful , because even thouqh you qet the court to qrant you a 
judgment, unless you ask the judge (burden on you) to make a 
separa te determinat ion t h a t the re i s no cause for delay in 
giving you a judqment, you can think you have a judqment t ha t 
c r ea t e s a judqment l ien but you real ly do not, so now all the 
boys l ike the IRS who don ' t have to do hardly a th inq to incumber 
property can run fancy free for all the t ime i t t akes you, and 
you can be lef t with nothinq." 
I don ' t care how hard Owners arque t h a t Rule 54b URCP 
a l t e r s the s t a t u t e on entry of judqments in Utah, i t does not and 
t h i s honorable court cannot take a procedural rule and apply i t 
t o a l t e r subs t an t ive , c lear , unambiquous codified s t a tu t e 
mandated by the l eg i s l a tu re as far back as 1943 and before. 
Arizona Fcirmers and Salina have no meri t to be 
considered by t h i s court in determininq when judqment l i ens 
a t t ach in the State of Utah. And if t h i s court has in t imated 
throuqh any pas t dec i s ions t h a t Rule 54b DRCP has any influence 
on a l te r inq when judgments a t tach as l i ens on r ea l property in 
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the State of Utah, those cases should be d i s t inguished , clarif ied 
or completely overturned. 
To rule otherwise deprives judgment c red i tors of some 
very precious r i gh t s and c rea tes a s i tua t ion where the burden i s 
placed upon the injured party ra ther than where i t belongs—on 
the court or injuring o a r t y - - t o gain p r io r i ty to a s s e t s ahead of 
those e n t i t i e s who can automatical ly f i le a nonjudicial mortgage, 
nonjudicial mechanics l ien , tax l ien or the l ike in no t ime. 
Executions are allowed on judgment l i ens immediately following 
judgment unless the court orders otherwise . That i s where the 
safeguard l i e s—not in declar ing judgments not really a judgment 
(for l ien purposes) if you don' t ask and then even af ter you ask, 
you don' t convince the t r i a l court t h a t "there i s no reason for 
delay" [for execu t ion ] . 
So what if a judgment l ien a t t a c h e s . I t should. Jus t as 
pre-judgment wri ts of at tachment are allowed under the law to 
preserve and pro tec t a s s e t s of the po ten t i a l judgment debtor, so 
judgments—as the l eg i s l a tu re has clearly expressed i t s in ten t , 
and thus the in t en t of the people —should a t tach as judgment 
l i ens a t the moment "the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court or 
c i r cu i t court i s docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of 
the d i s t r i c t court ." 78-22-1 UCA 1953, as amended 
You say, "But if every judgment automatical ly becomes a 
judgment l ien when t h e i r are s t i l l po ten t ia l cross claims or 
counterclaims which could cause o f f se t s , i t could injure the 
judgment debtor." My counter to you i s , "Who i s the injured? 
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When a c a s e g e t s h e a r d on t h e m e r i t s and a c o u r t d e t e r m i n e s 
t h e r e i s a r i g h t t o a j u d g m e n t , t h a t i s a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e i t i s 
much m o r e c l e a r e r t h e j u d g m e n t c r e d i t o r i s e n t i t l e d t o a p r i o r i t y 
l i e n i m m e d i a t e l y t o p r o t e c t h i s b e s t r i g h t s t o s a t i s f y t h a t 
j u d g m e n t t h a n i s a p e r s o n who p e t i t i o n s f o r a p r e j u d g m e n t w r i t 
of a t t a c h m e n t o r g a r n i s h m e n t w h e r e t h e m e r i t s h a v e n o t b e e n 
a i r e d , n o t i c e h a s n o t y e t b e e n g i v e n , and a f f i d a v i t s of t h e 
p l a i n t i f f o n l y h a v e b e e n s e e n by t h e c o u r t c l a i m i n g i r r e p a r a b l e 
ha rm a n d a b s c o n d i n g d e b t o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s o r t h e l i k e . " 
At t h e l e a s t , a p e r s o n e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t i s e n t i t l e d 
t o t h e r e a l e s t a t e l i e n a l l o w e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . I f t h e c o u r t 
w a n t s t o r e s t r i c t e x e c u t i o n on t h a t r e a l e s t a t e j u d g m e n t l i e n , l e t 
t h e m , b u t t h e b u r d e n s h o u l d b e on t h e c o u r t t o on i t s own m o t i o n 
s o r e s t r i c t i m m e d i a t e e x e c u t i o n on a j u d g m e n t l i e n o r t h e 
j u d g m e n t d e b t o r s h o u l d on i t s own m o t i o n and a t h i s b u r d e n , 
move f o r a n d c o n v i n c e t h e c o u r t t h a t i t s h o u l d be e n t i t l e d t o a 
s t a y on e x e c u t i o n of t h a t j u d g m e n t o r t h e j u d g m e n t l i e n . 
I f t h i s c o u r t d o e s n o t ho ld t h a t 7 8 - 2 2 - 1 OCA 1 9 5 3 m e a n s 
e x a c t l y w h a t i t s a y s i n a l l i n s t a n c e s , t h e n j u d g m e n t c r e d i t o r s 
e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t s h a v e an u n f a i r b u r d e n w h i c h t h e y h a v e no 
b u s i n e s s h a v i n g — a b u r d e n t h e c o u r t s a n d j u d g m e n t d e b t o r s 
s h o u l d b e a r , a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e y a r e b e i n g d e n i e d 
i r r e p a r a b l e l i e n p r i o r i t y t o a s s e t s of t h e j u d g m e n t d e b t o r . 
So w h a t i f t h e r e may be an o f f s e t e v e n t u a l l y g r a n t e d 
f rom a c r o s s c l a i m o r c o u n t e r c l a i m o r t h e l i k e i n m u l t i p a r t y 
s u i t s . I f s o , t h e a m o u n t of t h e l i e n w i l l be r e d u c e d i n t h e 
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amount of the offset or the l ien l i f ted a t the t ime of tha t 
determinat ion, but a t l e a s t - - a s with a ore-judqment l ienholder - -
the judqment c red i to r i s qiven the very minimum he deserves — a 
p r io r i ty as soon as possible to a s s e t s to sa t i s fy his judqment. 
Let ' s look a t t h i s problem with a l l encomoassinq e y e s - -
not with narrow expedient eyes . Look at the whole p ic tu re . 
Look a t how t h i s rulinq impacts injured persons . Injured 
persons have enouqh burden on t h e i r shoulders as i t i s to a s s e r t 
t h e i r r iqh t s in a system with qreat economic i n e q u i t i e s . Let 's 
consider the abused and injured 's r i q h t s . They are ent i t led to 
as a bare minimum, a l ien to pro tec t t h e i r p r io r i ty r iqh ts to 
recover t h e i r losses as soon as poss ib le , and in vertually all 
i n s t ances when a case has moved far alonq qnouqh to warrant 
judqment in t h e i r favor, whether other pa r t i e s are part of the 
l i t i g a t i o n or not. 
POINT 5: OWNERS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE IS DEFECTIVE 
Collateral to the main point of TRUE IDENTITY i s the 
e f fec t iveness of evidence presented by Owners in support of 
t h e i r summary judqment motion. The evidence in support of 
motions for summary judqment must be made on personal 
knowledge, se t forth such fac t s as would be admissible in 
evidence, and show aff irmatively t ha t the aff iant i s competent 
to t e s t i f y to the matters s ta ted the re in . Salt Lake City Corp. v 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P2d 42 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1988) 
Accordingly, a f f idav i t s must not be conclusory or mere 
cha rac t e r i z a t i ons . And if a party objects to the suff iciency of 
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them, the party must object to them or move to s t r ike them. 
Hobelman Motrs . I n c . v Al lred , 6 8 5 P2d 54 4, 54 6 (Utah 19 84) 
Well, Judgment Creditors did t h i s by motion to s t r ike 
Dart of Owners' exh ib i t s and argument. [R438-440] The aff ida-
v i t s of a Diane C. Green [R316-322], Pa t r ic ia L. Nield [R324-
327] , and V. Mark Peterson [R348-351] were al l objected to as 
s e t t i n g forth conclusory s t a t emen t s . They merely s t a t e they did 
not know. But they do not lay a foundation nor do they specify 
spec i f i c fac t s upon which the t r i e r of fact can determine the 
f a c t s . They are not proper evidence and should not have been 
considered by the t r i a l court in rendering i t s decis ion on 
summary judgment. 
Also objected to as being superfluous and not the bes t 
evidence were the copies of or ig ina l records of the court . The 
bes t evidence and the proper way to get t ha t evidence before the 
court when documents are already court documents not only a t 
t r i a l but a lso in proceedings on motions for summary judgment i s 
to ask the court to take jud ic ia l not ice of said pleadings or 
previously fi led documents. St« Louis BaDtist Temple, Inc. v 
Federal Deposit Insurance CorD., 605 P2d 1169 (CA10, Colorado 
1979) Accordingly, R256-309 should have been s t r icken by the 
t r i a l cour t . Such a ruling i s respectful ly requested of the 
supreme court to clarify the law in t h i s r e spec t . 
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CONCLUSION 
P l e a s e do n o t o v e r l o o k t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s m a i n i s s u e i n t h i s 
c a s e — t h a t of TRUE IDENTITY and how i t a f f e c t s p u b l i c and 
p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s . J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s and a l l t h o s e s i m i l a r l y 
s i t u a t e d w i l l be s e v e r e l y i n j u r e d i f t h e r e a l i t y of t h e V r e e k e n 
F a m i l y s c h e m e i s n o t r e c o g n i z e d f o r wha t i t i s - - a c l a s s i c 
e x a m p l e of w h i t e c o l l a r m a n i p u l a t i o n of i d e n t i t y . 
T h e s e J u d g m e n t D e b t o r s h a v e c r e a t e d t h i s h a v o c . They 
h a v e s w e p t t h r o u g h Utah and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and s e v e r a l 
f o r e i g n n a t i o n s l i k e a h u r r i c a n e l e a v i n g g r e a t d e s t r u c t i o n a s 
t h e i r a f t e r m a t h . They h a v e c a u s e d g r e a t c o n f u s i o n among 
s o c i e t y i n c l u d i n g t h e c o u r t s . But t h e f a c t c a n be p r o v e n i n t h i s 
c a s e : The V r e e k e n F a m i l y and a l l of t h e c a m o f l a u g e l a b e l s t h e y 
a d o p t e d and u s e d i n b u s i n e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s and i n h o l d i n g t i t l e 
t o p r o p e r t y a r e o n e and t h e s a m e . 
More t h a n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e h a s b e e n p r e s e n t e d t o t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t t o s e t up i s s u e s of g e n u i n e m a t e r i a l f a c t d e s e r v i n g 
of a f u l l p l e n a r y t r i a l b e f o r e t h e j u r y on t h e m e r i t s f o r 
q u e s t i o n s of i d e n t i t y a r e q u e s t i o n s of f a c t f o r t h e j u r y . 65 CJS 
N a m e s 16 
The e f f e c t s of t r u e i d e n t i t y m u s t flow from t h e 
b e g i n n i n g . In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e J u d g m e n t D e b t o r s win and t h e 
i n j u r e d l o s e i f t h e u n i l a t e r a l a d o p t i o n of c a m o f l a u g e l a b e l s 
( f i c t i t i o u s b u s i n e s s and p e r s o n a l n a m e s , p s e u d o n y m s , and 
a s s u m e d n a m e s ) a r e a l l o w e d t o i n a n y way a f f e c t t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s and r i g h t s of p u b l i c and p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s o r 
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e n t i t i e s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e can be no r u l e of law r e c o a n i z e d by 
Utah o t h e r t h a n t h a t p r o m u l g a t e d by T inn in . The q u e s t i o n of 
t r u e i d e n t i t y when i t i s r a i s e d m u s t be a o r e c e d e n t f i n d i n g of 
f a c t b e f o r e t h e a o o l i c a t i o n of a n y o t h e r l e g a l o r i n c i o l e s , 
s t a t u t e s o r r u l e s of c o u r t . 
WHEREFORE J u d g m e n t C r e d i t o r s ( A o o e l l a n t s ) o r a y f o r a 
r e v e r s a l of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t d i r e c t i n g a f u l l 
t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s . 
DATED t h i s (c) v X T V d a y of I UWAA/^. . 1990, 
George Wl McCune 
A t t o r n e y f o r A o o e l l a n t s 
Rone, B i e b e r , RAB Ranch 
and Gregg 
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78-22-1 JUDICIAL CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
AN\LYblS 
Exigence of agency 
Intel pretatum of statute 
Legal effect of written inbtrument 
Existence of agency. 
Where evidence in support of a particular 
agency is undisputed, the question of existence 
of agency is one of law for the court, but, where 
such agency is disputed, the question of the 
agency's existence is a mixed question of law 
and fact to be determined by the juiy 
McCornick v Queen of Sheha Gold Mining & 
Milling Co, 23 Utah 71, 63 P 820 (1900) 
In te rpre ta t ion of s ta tu te . 
Meaning of the phrase "domebtic or family 
remedies" in a statute delineating acts consti-
tuting the practice of medicine was a matter 
for determination by the court, not the jury 
State v Yee Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531, 147 P 488 
(1915). 
Legal effect of wii t ten ins t rument . 
The legal effect of a written nishunu nt l* for 
the deteimination of the court as a matter of 
law Verdi v Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502, 
196 P 225, 15 A L R 611 (1921) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75 Am Ju r 2d Trial § 320. 
C.J.S. — 88 C J S Trial & 300 
Key N u m b e r s . - Trial <s=> 213. 
CHAPTER 22 
JUDGMENT 
Section Section 
78-22-1. Lien of judgment. 
78-22-1.1. Judgment against party dying after 
verdict or decision 78-22-3 
78-22-2 Judgment against sheriff— When 78-22-4 
conclusive against sureties on 
indemnity bond. 
Judgment by confession authorized. 
Mileage allowance fur judgment 
debtor required to appear 
78-22-1. Lien of judgment. 
From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed 
and filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county it becomes 
a lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from 
execution, in the county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him at 
the time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien. A 
transcript of judgment rendered in a district court or circuit court of this state, 
in any county thereof, may be filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of 
the district court of any other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall 
have, for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same force and effect as a 
judgment entered in the district court in such county. The lien shall continue 
for eight years unless the judgment is previously satisfied or unless the en-
forcement of the judgment is stayed on appeal by the execution of a sufficient 
undertaking as provided by law, in which case the lien of the judgment ceases. 
354 
25-1-13 FRAUD 
this chapter as against creditors and purchasers shall be equally void as 
against the heirs, successors, personal representatives or assigns of such 
creditors or purchasers. 
25-1-13. Bona fide purchasers not affected. The provisions of this 
chapter shall not be construed to affect or impair the title of a purchaser 
for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that such purchaser had pre-
vious notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor, or of the 
fraud rendering void the title of such grantor. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §2475; 
C.L. 1917, § 5822; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-1-12. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §2476; 
C.L. 1917, § 5823; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-1-13. 
Collateral References. 
Fraudulent Conveyances <§== 192. 
37 CJS Fraudulent Conveyances § 282. 
37 AmJur 2d 801, Fraudulent Conveyances 
§ 121. 
Necessity of participation by the grantee 
or transferee in the fraud of the grantor or 
transferor in order to avoid a voluntary con-
veyance or transfer as against creditors, 17 
ALR 728. 
Presumption and burden of proof as 
regards good faith and consideration on part 
of purchaser or one taking encumbrance sub-
sequent to unrecorded conveyance or encum-
brance, 107 ALR 502. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §2473; 
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-1-14. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws 
1876, § 1016; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 2837. 
Assignee of prior claims. 
Under this section, where plaintiff, after 
filing of chattel mortgage, secured assign-
ment of a claim against the mortgagor which 
Right of grantee, mortgagee or transferee 
in instrument fraudulent as to creditors to 
protection to extent of consideration paid by 
him, 79 ALR 132. 
Right of grantee, or his privies, to main-
tain suit or proceeding for affirmative relief, 
where claim is made or anticipated that con-
veyance was made with intention on part of 
grantor, but without actual fraud by grantee, 
to defraud former's creditors, 128 ALR 1504. 
Right of grantee or transferee to be reim-
bursed for expenditures in payment of taxes 
or encumbrances on property where convey-
ance or transfer is in fraud of creditors, 8 
ALR 527. 
Rights as between creditors of fraudulent 
grantor, where one or more of them, in pay-
ment of or as security for his debt, receives 
deed or mortgage from fraudulent grantee, 
114 ALR 406. 
had accrued previous to the filing, plaintiff 
acquired all rights of such mortgagor 
therein, including right to invalidate mort-
gage. Volker Lbr. Co. v. Utah & Oregon Lbr. 
Co. (1915) 45 U 603, 148 P 365, Ann Cas 
1917D, 1158. 
Badges of fraud. 
Transaction of 3ale, without delivery or 
change of possession of things sold, was 
fraudulent as against creditors of vendor, so 
25-1-14. Sales without change of possession. Every sale made by a 
seller of goods or chattels in his possession or under his control, and every 
assignment of goods and chattels, unless the same is accompanied by a 
delivery within a reasonable time, and is followed by an actual and contin-
ued change of the possession of the things sold or assigned, shall be conclu-
sive evidence of fraud as against the creditors of the seller or assignor, 
or subsequent purchasers in good faith. The word "creditors" as used in 
this section shall be construed to include all persons who shall be creditors 
of the seller or assignor at any time while such goods and chattels shall 
remain in his possession or under his control. 
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as to authorize granting of attachment. 
Charleston Co-op. v. A. W. Allen & Bros. 
(1912) 40 U 575, 123 P 578, Ann Cas 1914D, 
1092. 
Many badges of fraud are set out in 
Boccalero v. Bee (1942) 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 
1063. 
Bona fide purchasers. 
Conveyance of homestead by debtor to wife 
and by her to third person for cash, mort-
gage to her, and assumption of husband's 
debt to another, also secured by mortgage 
given by purchaser, who subsequently paid 
said assumed debt, where transactions were 
completed prior to any judgment against 
debtor husband, and purchaser from wife 
was unaware of this latter indebtedness, was 
not voidable as fraudulent. State Bank of 
Beaver County v. Mortensen (1925) 66 U 290, 
241 P 1055. 
Change of possession. 
Sale of machinery by corporation to newly 
organized operational subsidiary in good 
faith cannot be voided on behalf of one who 
became creditor after transfer, on ground 
that there was no change of possession and 
transaction, therefore, was fraudulent. 
Boston Acme Mines Development Co. v. 
Clawson (1925) 66 U 103, 240 P 165. 
"Creditor" defined. 
The term "creditor" includes all persons 
who may have claims against mortgagor at 
any time while mortgaged goods and chattels 
remain in his possession. Volker Lbr. Co. v. 
Utah & Oregon Lbr. Co. (1915) 45 U 603, 148 
P 365, Ann Cas 1917D, 1158. 
Evidence. 
Where a debtor in a cleaning business gave 
a bill of sale to plaintiff but kept and used 
the equipment involved and received addi-
tional equipment from the plaintiff who 
retained title under a conditional sales con-
tract, the plaintiff was not entitled to a sum-
mary judgment in an action involving the 
machinery since there was a disputed fact 
question as to notice to or knowledge of the 
sale by defendant who had loaned money 
secured by chattel mortgages on the machin-
ery. Martin Machinery v. Strevell-Paterson 
Finance Co. (1958) 7 U 2d 316, 324 P 2d 776. 
History of section. 
It will be noted that this section was taken 
from Comp. Laws 1907, due to the fact that 
the last sentence was repealed by Comp. 
Laws 1917, and was restored in 1933. See 
Hansen v. Daniels (1928) 73 U 142, 272 P 941. 
Pleadings. 
Allegation in action to set aside convey-
ance that grantor remains in possession of 
land after its conveyance is an allegation of 
fact, and may or may not prove fraud. Smith 
v. Edwards (1932) 81 U 244,17 P 2d 264. 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, 
unaccompanied by change of possession, is 
fraudulent per se as to execution creditors of, 
or subsequent purchasers from, seller or 
assignor does not necessarily apply to assign-
ments for benefit of creditors, but long delay 
in taking possession is circumstance from 
which fraud may be prima facie inferred. 
Snyder v. Murdock (1899) 20 U 419, 59 P 91. 
Collateral References. 
Fraudulent Conveyances C=> 131 et seq. 
37 CJS Fraudulent Conveyances §187 et 
seq. 
37 AmJur 2d 728 et seq., Fraudulent Con-
veyances § 38 et seq. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Change of possession. 
Change of possession must be actual and 
not merely constructive or temporary. 
Everett v. Brigham (1896) 14 U 242, 47 P 75. 
After delivery of possession, vendee may 
appoint vendor to hold property for him as 
his trustee or agent, or may make him his 
employee, but such appointment or employ-
ment must be in good faith, and may be 
regarded as suspicious circumstance and be 
considered by jury, with all of other evidence, 
in determining whether possession was taken 
and held in good faith. Everett v. Brigham 
(1896) 14 U 242, 47 P 75. 
There is no fixed rule, which will govern all 
cases, as to what is necessary to constitute 
such delivery and change of possession as are 
required by this section, but each case must 
be governed by its own particular facts and 
circumstances. Blish v. McCornick (1897) 15 
U 188, 49 P 529. 
Reasonable time for delivery. 
Reasonable time should be allowed in 
which to make delivery. White v. Pease 
(1897) 15 U 170, 49 P 416. 
25-1-15. Rights of creditors with matured claims. Where a convey-
ance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when his 
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claim has matured, may, as against any person, except a purchaser for fair 
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase 
or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a pur-
chaser: 
(1) have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent 
necessary to satisfy his claim; or, 
f (2) J disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy execution upon, the 
pfopCTty conveyed. 
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than 
a fair consideration for the conveyance or obligation may retain the prop-
erty or obligation as security for repayment. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 42, § 9; R S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 33-1-15. 
Defenses. 
Defendant in suit to set aside conveyance 
to his wife as fraudulent may interpose 
defense that property is exempt from execu-
tion, and does not exceed in value his maxi-
mum homestead, and upon submission of 
proof thereof by defendant, court will be 
required to make findings with respect 
thereto. Cardon v. Harper (1944) 106 U 560, 
151 P 2d 99, 154 ALR 906, following Williams 
v. Peterson (1935) 86 U 526, 46 P 2d 674. 
— evidence. 
Evidence in action to set aside conveyance 
by grantor of property of fair value of $3,250 
for $10 and other valuable consideration to 
daughters, held to show that conveyance was 
fraudulent as to creditors. Zuniga v. Evans 
(1935) 87 U 198, 48 P 2d 513, 101 ALR 532, 
distinguished in 102 U 12,126 P 2d 1063. 
Garnishment proceeding. 
Fact that pleadings in garnishment pro-
ceedings revealed that indebtedness sued 
upon was that of individuals and that those 
individuals had no account with garnishee 
bank, the only account being with corpora-
tion owned by individuals, did not make 
cause of action one, under this section, to set 
aside conveyance, and thus argument that 
court had never obtained jurisdiction of cor-
porate defendant or of res since no service of 
summons was made upon corporation could 
not be maintained; the pleading sufficiently 
averred a sham transaction between the indi-
viduals and the corporation so that they 
should be considered as identical for purpose 
of garnishment proceedings. Stine v. Girola 
(1959) 9 U 2d 22, 337 P 2d 62. 
Transfer of stock could be set aside as a 
fraudulent conveyance on motion in garnish-
ment proceeding, and it was not necessary to 
file a separate action to obtain such relief. 
Jensen v. Eames (1974) 30 U 2d 423, 519 P 2d 
236. 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Where grantees were in possession of 
premises pursuant to duly recorded deed and 
were paying taxes thereon, it was incumbent 
upon plaintiffs, in action to set aside convey-
ance, to allege and prove that grantees as 
such did certain acts which misled plaintiffs, 
or held themselves out in a way that misled 
plaintiffs and that plaintiffs had knowledge 
and relied thereon. Smith v. Edwards (1932) 
81 U 244, 17 P 2d 264. 
Burden of proof is not on plaintiff to show 
that property, alleged to have been fraudu-
lently conveyed, is not exempt from execu-
tion. Cardon v. Harper (1944) 106 U 560, 151 
P2d99,154 ALR906. 
Setting aside mortgage. 
A creditor with a matured claim may have 
a mortgage, a conveyance under 25-1-1, set 
aside under this section to the extent neces-
sary to satisfy his claim, where such convey-
ance was made without fair consideration, 
defined in 25-1-3, and would render the per-
son making it insolvent. Ned J. Bowman Co. 
v. White (1962) 13 U 2d 173, 369 P 2d 962. 
Collateral References. 
Fraudulent Conveyances <3= 226 et seq. 
37 CJS Fraudulent Conveyances § 306 et 
seq. 
37 AmJur 2d 827 et seq., Fraudulent Con-
veyances § 157 et seq. 
Admissibility of declarations of grantor or 
transferor on issue as to whether conveyance 
or transfer was in fraud of creditors, 83 ALR 
1446. 
Admissibility of subsequent declarations of 
vendor on issue whether sale was in fraud of 
creditors, 64 ALR 797. 
Assignability of executor's or administra-
tor's right to attack conveyance or transfer 
14 
25-6-9 FRAUD 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the 
creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its 
proceeds. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-8, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, § 8; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to 
25-6-8. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Compilers Notes. — See the Compiler's 
Notes following § 25-6-1. 
25-6-9. Good faith transfer. 
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a) 
against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value 
or against any subsequent transferee or obligee. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is 
voidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(l)(a), the creditor 
may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under 
Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, which-
ever is less. The judgment may be entered against: 
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the 
transfer was made; or 
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who 
took for value or from any subsequent transferee. 
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset 
transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the 
asset at the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may 
require. 
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this 
chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the 
value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to: 
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred; 
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment. 
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(b) or Section 
25-6-6 if the transfer results from: 
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termina-
tion is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or 
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Chapter 9, 
Title 70A, the Uniform Commercial Code. 
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2): 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the 
debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a 
valid lien; 
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the 
debtor and the insider; or 
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and 
the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an 
antecedent debt of the debtor. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Disqualification of office taking acknowl-
Acknowledgment by mortgagee. edgment. 
Disqualification of office taking acknowledg- l f acknowledgment is taken before officer 
ment. disqualified to act, certificate is ineffectual. 
Cited. Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 
Acknowledgment by mortgagee. (19ol). 
An acknowledgment taken by mortgagee
 c i t e d i n G e n e r a , G]ag$ c v M a g t C o n s ( r 
himself as a notary public is void, and renders
 n nc~ n OJ AnCi lT,. , n* K moo 
mortgage unrecordable. Norton v. Fuller, 68 C o " 7 6 6 R 2 d 4 2 9 ( L l a h C t A ^ 1 9 8 8 • 
Utah 524, 251 P. 29 U926K 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments C.J.S. — 1A C.J.S. Acknowledgments § 8. 
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 123. Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment «=» 1-4. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and 
Recording Laws § 77. 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Change in interest rate — 
Validity of document — Notice of unnamed inter-
ests — Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner 
prescribed by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a 
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing state-
ment complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not acknowledged shall, 
from the time of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to 
all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest 
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underly-
ing secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the 
document provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to 
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the 
document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, 
names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without 
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any 
third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any 
other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to 
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he 
appears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this 
title that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest 
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CL. 1907, § 2000; ment designated the existing language a* Sub-
C.L. 1917, §4900; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, section (1) and divided the formerly undivided 
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54; 1985, ch. 159, language into two sentence*, in Subjection <1), 
§ 7; 1988, ch. 155, § 14; 1989, ch. 88, § 8. deleted "the provisions of before "Section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- 70A-9-402" in the first sentence and made 
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word "recorded." Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile 
& Inv. Co., 76 Utah 1, 287 P. 188 (1930>. 
Cited in Billings v. Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd. 
COLLATERAL 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and 
Recording Laws § 98. 
C.J.S. — 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser 
§ 324. 
A.L.R. — Recorded real property instrument 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2001; 
C.L. 1917, § 4901; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-3-3; L. 1988, ch. 155, § 15; 1989, ch. 88, 
§ 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, substituted "docu-
ment" for "conveyance of real estate" in the 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of failure to record. 
Mortgage. 
Obligation of grantor. 
Priorities. 
—Description of property insufficient. 
—Prior unrecorded conveyance. 
Cited. 
Effect of failure to record. 
Where, after mortgage was executed on cer-
tain tract of land, owner executed deed to 
grantee on property not included in mortgage, 
which deed was not recorded, decree in action 
to foreclose mortgage on tract of land, includ-
ing part conveyed to grantee, was not binding 
on grantee who was not party to such action. 
Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 
P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935). 
A judgment lien is subordinate and inferior 
to a deed which predated it whether recorded 
after such judgment or whether not recorded at 
all. Kartchner v. State Tax Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 
382, 294 P.2d 790 (1956). 
Mortgage. 
This section applies to mortgage liens, mort-
gagee is purchaser, and law of priority of 
record applies to mortgages. Federal Land 
(In re Granada, Inc.), 92 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. D. 
Utah 1988). 
REFERENCES 
as charging third party with constructive no-
tice of provisions, of extrinsic instrument re-
ferred to therein. 89 A.L.R.3d 901. 
Key Numbers. — Vendor and Purchaser $=» 
23KD. 
introductory paragraph; added Subsections (1) 
and (2), deleting comparable provisions from 
the introductory paragraph; and made minor 
stylistic changes. 
The 1989 amendment, effective July 1, 1989, 
substituted "document" for "conveyance" in 
Subsection (2). 
Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 P.2d 480, 102 
A.L.R. 819 (1935). 
Obligation of grantor. 
The grantor of property has no implied obli-
gation to protect the grantee's rights by record-
ing the grantee's interest in the property or by 
informing third parties of the existence uf the 
interest. If the grantee fails to record, he as-
sumes the risk of a subsequent grantee of the 
same land acquiring superior rights to his by 
recordation. Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Priorities. 
—Description of property insufficient. 
Although defendant's deed was recorded 
first, failure of deed to adequately describe dis-
puted portion of land resulted in omission of 
that portion from the deed, so that plaintiffs 
later-recorded deed, which included the dis-
puted property, voided defendant's claim to the 
propertv. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P 2d 979 'Utah 
1979). 
—Prior un reco rded conveyance . 
Innocent purchaser for value without notice 
of previous conveyance, who first records his 
conveyance, takes preference over prior unre-
57-3-3, Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Gen. v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 
114 A.L.R. 726 (1937). 
Defendant's pleading of the statute of limita-
tions generally without designating the sec-
tions of the statute or statutes upon which he 
relied was not in accordance with Subdivision 
(h) and therefore was an inadequate plea. 
Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 
70, 465 P.2d 1007 M970). 
Cited in Battistune v. American Land & 
Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980K 
Kat/enberger v. State, 735 P.2d 1U5 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur . 2d Associations 
and Clubs § 57; 19 Am. Jur . 2d Corporations 
§§ 2220, 2225; 22 Am. Jur . 2d Damages § 819 
et seq.; 37 Am. Jur . 2d Fraud and Deceit 
§§ 424 to 427; 50 Am. Jur . 2d Libel and Slan-
der §§ 403, 422 et seq.; 51 Am. Jur . 2d Limita-
tion of Actions § 459; 59 Am. Jur . 2d Parties 
§§ 27, 34 to 40; 61A Am. Jur . 2d Pleading §§ 9 
to 14, 40, 53 to 56, 86 to 88; 65 Am. Jur . 2d 
Quieting Title § 69. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Associations § 35; 19 
C.J.S. Corporations §§ 1327, 1334; 25 C.J.S. 
Damages § 131; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander 
§§ 161 et seq., 171 et seq.; 54 C.J.S. Limita-
tions of Actions § 269 et seq.; 67 C.J.S. Parties 
§ 98; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 8, 21, 22, 25, 27, 
33, 76, 80, 86; 74 C.J.S. Quieting Title §§ 56, 
63; 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 445, 446. 
A.L.R. — Recovery of punitive damages in 
action by purchasers of real property charging 
fraud or misrepresentation, 19 A.L.R.4th 801. 
Reports of pleadings as within privilege for 
reports of judicial proceedings, 20 A L R.4th 
576. 
Amendment of pleading after limitation has 
run, so as to set up subsequent appointment as 
executor or administrator of plaintiff who pro-
fessed to bring the action in that capacity with-
out previous valid appointment, 27 A.L.R.4th 
198. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Associations <s= 20(5): 
Corporations &> 513(4), 514; Damages «= 142 
Libel and Slander <£=> 77 et seq., 90 et seq.; Lim-
itation of Actions «=» 183; Parties &* 72 to 74: 
P l e a d i n g s 8(1), (9), (13), (14), (15», (16), «18). 
14, 32, 39, 46, 59, 63; Quieting Title *=» 34(3) 
Statutes «=» 280. 
Rule 10. Form of pleadings. 
(a) Caption; names of parties. Every pleading shall contain a caption 
setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, and 
a designation as in Rule 7(a). In the complaint the title of the action shall 
include the names of all the parties, but in other pleadings it is sufficient to 
state the name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of 
other parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated by any 
name and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem 
unknown parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any 
interest in the subject-matter of this action." 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense 
shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be 
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; 
and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. 
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each de-
fense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense when-
ever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth. 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be 
adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another 
pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all 
purposes. 
(d) Paper used for pleadings; size and style. All pleadings and other 
papers filed in any action, except printed documents or other similar exhibits, 
shall be typewritten on good, white, unglazed paper of letter size (8V2" x 11"), 
with a margin at the top of each page of not less than 2 inches and a left hand 
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nonresident infant defendant shall have 20 days after his appointment in 
which to plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or 
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or 
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates may be sued by common name. When two or more per-
sons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership 
or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a com-
mon name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they 
may be sued by such common name; and any judgment obtained against the 
defendant in such case shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the 
same manner as if all had been named defendants and had been sued upon 
their joint liability. 
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a 
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of 
Utah in one or more places in his own name or a common trade name, and 
said business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superinten-
dent, or agent, said person may be sued in his own name in any action arising 
out of the conduct of said business. 
Compiler ' s Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 17, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Associates. 
—Joint venture. 
—Partnership. 
—Unincorporated association. 
Infants. 
—Action for injury of minor. 
Suit by mother. 
—Control by court. 
—Failure to comply. 
Relief from judgment. 
Nonresident doing business in state. 
—Not found. 
Real party in interest. 
—Assignee. 
—Corporation. 
Assignment of assets to another corpora-
tion. 
Foreign corporation. 
Shareholder. 
—Insurance company. 
—Joint tort-feasors. 
—Partner in joint venture. 
—Purpose of rule. 
—Wife. 
Cited. 
Associates . 
—Join t venture . 
Joint venturers may sue in the name of the 
Cross-References. — Guardians, § 75-5-
101 et seq. 
Service of process, Rule 4. 
joint venture. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 95 
Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1988). 
—Par tne r sh ip . 
Subdivision (d) does not affirmatively allow 
a partnership to bring suit in its common 
name, but the absence of a provision specifi-
cally authorizing a lawsuit in the partnership 
name is not indicative of an intent to prohibit 
such a suit. Gary Energy Corp. v. Metro Oil 
Prods., 114 F.R.D. 69 (D. Utah 1987). 
—Unincorpora ted associat ion. 
Subdivision (d) does not authorize an unin-
corporated association to institute an action in 
its common name. Disabled Am. Veterans v. 
Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 
(1959). 
Infants . 
—Action for injury of minor . 
Suit by mother . 
Under this rule, mother as guardian ad litem 
for benefit of father could bring action for inju-
ries to sixteen-year-old son where father, an 
immigrant, had a somewhat limited use of En-
glish and business matters were mainly han-
dled by the mother; § 78-11-6 providing for 
suit by father was not exclusive remedy. 
Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 
P.2d 1177 (1971). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence 
for a court sitting without a jury. 
(d) Proceedings. 
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the 
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a 
copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt 
thereof unless the order of reference otherwise 
provides, the master shall forthwith set a time 
and place for the first meeting of the parties or 
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after 
the date of the order of reference and shall notify 
the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the 
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence. 
Either party, on notice to the parties and master, 
may apply to the court for an order requiring the 
master to speed the proceedings and to make his 
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and 
place appointed, the master may proceed ex parte 
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a 
future day, giving notice to the absent party of 
the adjournment. 
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the 
attendance of witnesses before the master by the 
issuance and service of subpoenal! as provided in 
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness 
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be pun-
ished as for a contempt and be subjected to the 
consequences, penalties, and remedies provided 
in Rules 37 and 45. 
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of 
accounting are in issue before the master, he 
may prescribe the form in which the accounts 
shall be submitted and in any proper case may 
require or receive in evidence a statement by a 
certified public accountant who is called as a wit-
ness. Upon objection of a party to any of the 
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the 
form of statement is insufficient, the master may 
require a different form of statement to be fur-
nished, or the accounts or specific items thereof 
to be proved by oral examination of the account-
ing parties or upon written interrogatories or in 
such other manner as he directs. 
(e) Report. 
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall 
prepare a report upon the matters submitted to 
him by the order of reference and, if required to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he 
shall set them forth in the report. He shall file 
the report with the clerk of the court and in an 
action to be tried without a jury, unless other-
wise directed by the order of reference, shall file 
with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the 
evidence and the original exhibits. The clerk 
shall forthwith mail to all parties notice of the 
filing. 
(2) In non-jury actions. In an action to be 
tried without a jury the court shall accept the 
master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. 
Within 10 days after being served with notice of 
the filing of the report any parity may serve writ-
ten objections thereto upon the other parties. Ap-
plication to the court for action upon the report 
and upon objections thereto shall be by motion 
and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The 
court after hearing may adopt the report or may 
modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or 
may receive further evidence or may recommit it 
with instructions. 
(3) Injury actions. In an action to be tried by 
a jury the master shall not be directed to report 
the evidence. His findings upon the issues sub-
mitted to him are admissible as evidence of the 
matters found and may be read to the jury, sub-
ject to the ruling of the court upon any objections 
in point of law which may be made to the report. 
(4) Stipulation as to findings. The effect of a 
master's report is the same whether or not the 
parties have consented to the reference; but, 
when the parties stipulate that a master's find-
ings of fact shall be final, only questions of law 
arising upon the report shall thereafter be con-
sidered. 
(5) Draft report. Before filing his report a 
master may submit a draft thereof to counsel for 
all parties for the purpose of receiving their sug-
gestions. 
(0 Objections to appointment of master. A 
party may object to the appointment of any person as 
a master on the same grounds as a party may chal-
lenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial 
of a civil action. Such objections must be heard and 
disposed of by the court in the same manner as a 
motion. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these 
rules includes a decree and any order from which an 
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of 
prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or in-
volving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-pairty 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of 
such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the rights and lia-
bilities of fewer than all the parties shall not termi-
nate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and 
the order or other form of decision is subject to revi-
sion at any time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the pan-ties. 
(c) Demand for judgment 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when 
the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as be-
tween or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by de-
fault shall not be different in kind from, or ex-
ceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in 
the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute of 
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed 
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as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in con-
nection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his 
costs must within five days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memoran-
dum of the items of his costs and necessary dis-
bursements in the action, and file with the court 
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessar-
ily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 
seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed 
by the court in which the judgment was ren-
dered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after 
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the 
judgment The clerk must include in any judgment 
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985). 
Rule 55. Default 
(a) Default 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or te be taken or to eerve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
get it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim-
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In ail cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof.
 m 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
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facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facta as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons Btated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, 
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circum-
stances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases 
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy 
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar. 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless 
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict o( a 
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict ac-
companied by answers to interrogatories returned by 
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith 
signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided 
in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of 
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in regis-
ter of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is 
complete and shall be deemed entered for all pur-
poses, except the creation of a lien on real property, 
when the same is signed and filed as herein above 
provided. The clerk shall immediately make a nota-
tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the 
judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment The 
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
of the court However, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of 
this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party 
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact 
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judg-
ment by confession is authorized by statute, the party 
seeking the same must file with the clerk of the court 
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, 
verified by the defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money 
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the 
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the 
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contin-
gent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not ex-
ceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for 
a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the state-
ment, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment 
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of 
entry, if any. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985 and Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judg-
ment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any 
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, 
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor 
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed 
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within 
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly ac-
knowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by ac-
knowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the 
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the 
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the 
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satis-
faction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more 
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming 
them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court When a judg-
ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of 
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall 
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was 
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof, 
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the 
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered 
upon the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction 
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the 
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, 
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also 
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, in-
cluding the amount paid, on the margin of the judg-
ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfac-
tion. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall 
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any 
Rule 58A UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Oil Shale Corp v I arson, 20 Utah 
2d 369, 438 P 2d 540 (1968) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am Jur 2d Declara- declaiatory relief in state court, 33 A L R 4th 
tory Judgments *§ 183, 186, 203 et seq 146 
C.J.S. — 26 C J S Declaratory Judgments Key Numbers. — Declaratory Judgment «=> 
S§ 17, 18, 104, 155 41, 42, 251, 367 
A.L.R. — Right to jury trial in action for 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otheiwibe 
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict 
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special 
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories re-
turned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate 
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other eases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof 
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judg-
ment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is 
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make 
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing party shall 
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. How-
ever, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice require-
ment of this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may neverthe-
less be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is au-
thorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the 
defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it 
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the 
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the 
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs 
of entry, if any. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985 and Jan. 1, 1987.) 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
********* 
LON S. NIELD, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID R. BATEMAN in his 
capacity as Sheriff of 
Utah County, Utah; et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CV87-2319 
JUDGE BOYD L. PARK 
********* 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the 
Court on Plaintiffs', Lon S. Nield, Patricia L. Nield, November 
Investors, Mark Peterson, and Nancy L. Peterson's, Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court, having read the Motion, and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of and in 
Opposition to the Motion, now makes the following findings and 
ruling: 
FINDINGS 
1. Plaintiffs, Lon S. Nield, Patricia L. Nield, November 
Investors, Mark Peterson, and Nancy L. Peterson Motioned the 
Court for Summary Judgment as against Defendants, B. J. Rone, 
Ronald A. Bieber, RAB Ranch, and James A. Gregg, on Counts I, II, 
III, and IV of Plaintiffs' Complaint and against Sheriff Bateman, 
solely as to Count II of the Complaint. 
2. This Court having spent an inordinate amount of time 
reviewing and analyzing several cases of the Fourth District 
Court, to wit: Case No's. 63,505, 63,522, 63,923 and 64,055,as 
requested by Plaintiffs' counsel, and further having researched 
and evaluated numerous statutes, title reports, Affidavits, Court 
transcripts, Deeds, and cases cited in the parties respective 
Memorandums, finds that even though some factual questions still 
exist (particularly regarding chain of title), the Court does not 
believe these to be material issues of fact particularly in view 
of the Utah Court of Appeals affirmation of Judge Baliff's ruling 
in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960 (Utah 1988) Civil No. 
(CV86-2491), finding improper service of process. 
RULING 
1. Plaintiffs, Lon S. Nield, Patricia L. Nield, November 
Investors, Mark Peterson, and Nancy L. Peterson's, Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
DATED this J?/ day of August, 1989. 
BOYD'L. PARK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: Michael M. Later, Esq. 
George M. McCune, Esq. 
Guy R. Burningham, Esq, 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (A2033) 
Michael M. Later (A3728) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Dennis Norton (A2425) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LON S. NIELD, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ] 
DAVID R. BATEMAN in his 
capacity as Sheriff of ; 
Utah County, Utah; et al., ; 
Defendants. 
i JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. CV87-2319 
1 (Judge Boyd L. Park) 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment came before the 
Court for hearing on Friday, January 13, 1989. Plaintiffs sought 
to have this Court declare that certain judgments held by defen-
dants did not constitute liens against plaintiffs7 homes and to 
enjoin defendants from attempting to foreclose upon plaintiffs7 
homes. The Court's ruling with respect to Counts I and II of 
plaintiffs' Complaint resolves all issues regarding the existence 
w^i L ;•] 
l 
of any lien in favor of the defendants against plaintiffs' homes, 
there exists no good reason for delay in entry of this ruling as 
a final judgment and, therefore, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby enters judgment as 
follows with respect to Counts I and II of plaintiffs' Complaint: 
The default judgment in favor of B. J. Rone in the case 
of B. J. Rone v. Kurt Vreeken, et a L , Civil No. 63,522, in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah; the 
default judgment in favor of Ronald A. Bieber in the case of Ronald 
A. Bieber dba RAB Ranch v. Kurt Vreeken, et a L , Civil No. 64,055, 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of 
Utah; and the default judgment in favor of James A. Gregg in the 
case of James A. Gregg v. Kurt Vreeken, et al. Civil No. 63,923, 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of 
Utah, are invalid due to defects in service of process and do not, 
in any event, constitute final judgment. The above-listed default 
judgments in favor of B.J. Rone, Ronald A. Bieber, and James A. 
Gregg do not constitute liens against the home of Lon S. and 
Patricia L. Nield including the following described parcel of real 
property in Utah County, Utah: 
Lot 1, Plat A, Shadow Mountain Estates, 
Utah County, Utah according to the offi-
cial plat thereof in the office of the 
Utah County Recorder, less and excepting 
-2-
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the following tract: Commencing at the 
Southeast corner of Lot 12, Plat A, Shadow 
Mountain Estates Subdivision, Alpine; 
thence North 11°27'56" East 325.12 feet; 
thence South 9°34' 18" West 323.13 feet; 
thence West 10.90 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
The above-listed default judgments in favor of B.J. Rone, Ronald 
A. Bieber, and James A. Gregg do not constitute liens against the 
home of Mark and Nancy L. Peterson, including the following 
described parcel of real property located in Utah County, Utah: 
Lot 12, Plat A, Shadow Mountain Estates 
Subdivision, Alpine, Utah, according to 
the official plat thereof on file and of 
record in the Utah County Recorder's 
office. 
Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from conducting any 
sheriff's sale, foreclosure, or other form of execution against the 
Nield and Peterson homes pursuant to the above-referenced default 
judgments in favor of B.J. Rone, Ronald A. Bieber, and James A. 
Gregg. 
DATED this >f <^ day of October, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
/' ) 
A-v// 
BOYD L. PARK 
D i s t r i c t J u d g e 
(fat-n044 kjp5) 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
iyHJJL£ /JA^. 
Michael M. Latei 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
George L. McCune 
Attorney for Defendant Rone, 
Bieber, RAB Ranch and Gregg 
Guy R. Burningham 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for David R. Bateman 
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